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“Men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish.”
- Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (1958)
INTRODUCTION
Ten years after its statute came into force, the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”) completed it first trial, issued its first verdict,1
and sentenced its first perpetrator.2 The prospect of a permanent
mechanism to bring to justice perpetrators of gross human rights
violations has captured the imagination of ordinary people, victims,
human rights advocates, and even celebrities. Angelina Jolie, actress
1 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/062842, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, para. 1358 (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.
2 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/062901, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, paras. 92-99 (July
10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1438370.pdf.
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and Goodwill Ambassador for the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, was in the court gallery to hear firsthand the judgment against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.3 He was found
guilty of war crimes for conscripting and enlisting children under the
age of fifteen and using them to participate actively in hostilities.4 As
a result, countless children died and those who survived will suffer
continued psychological, emotional, and physical trauma for many
years to come. For these grave crimes, Lubanga was sentenced to
fourteen years of imprisonment.5 It was a significant day capping
many “firsts” in the nascent life of the world’s first permanent
international criminal justice mechanism: the first guilty verdict of the
ICC, the first international trial to focus exclusively on child
soldiering,6 and the first international trial to allow victims to
participate directly in the trial proceedings.7 Nevertheless, important
milestones and the successful prosecution of Lubanga are not likely
Ben Child, Kony 2012: Angelina Jolie calls for Ugandan warlord’s arrest, THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 12, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2012/mar/12/kony2012-angelina-jolie; Angelina Jolie attends ICC hearing to witness Lubanga Decision,
AFRICANEWSWIRE.NET,
Mar.
14
2012,
http://www.africanewswire.net/story.php?title=angelina-jolie-attends-icc-hearingto-witness-lubanga-decision. See Angelina Jolie in court as ICC finds Congo warlord
Thomas Lubanga guilty of using child soldiers, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 14, 2012,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/democraticre
publicofcongo/9143254/Angelina-Jolie-in-court-as-ICC-finds-Congo-warlordThomas-Lubanga-guilty-of-using-child-soldiers.html, for a video of Ms. Jolie’s
statements following the verdict.
4 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74,
supra note 1, at para.1358. See also Kai Ambos, The First Judgment of the International
Criminal court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues, 12
INT’L CR. L. REV. 115, 138-39 (2012); Diane Marie Amann, Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 812 (2012).
5 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant
to Article 76, supra note 2, at para. 99.
6 See generally MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY (2012), for a reinvigorating and provocative
examination of child soldiering.
7 David Smith, Congo Child Army Leader Thomas Lubanga Found Guilty of
War
Crimes,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Mar.
14
2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/mar/14/congo-warlord-thomas-lubangaicc?intcmp=239; Faith Karimi, ICC finds Congolese warlord guilty in its first verdict, CNN
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/14/world/africa/hague-first-iccruling/index.html?_s=PM:AFRICA.
3
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to end the debate any time soon over the merits of the ICC and the
role of international criminal justice mechanisms.8 Hours after the
court sentenced Lubanga to fourteen years, negative reactions
populated the media and the internet.9 For ICC Presiding Judge
Adrian Fulford to stare down at Lubanga and forcefully declare that
his crimes are “undoubtedly very serious crimes that affect the
international community as a whole[,]”10 but then impose a
punishment that is less then half of the maximum term penalty
available under the ICC Statute must have been perplexing, even for
supporters of the Court.11 Human rights observers criticized the
punishment as “a rather low sentence in relation to the crimes that he
8 Criticisms have targeted both the ICC model as a viable justice
mechanism post-atrocity and the way Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the ICC Prosecutor,
conducted the investigations and trial. See Joshua Rozenberg, Delay in Lubanga
judgment demonstrates ICC weaknesses, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 14 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/mar/14/delay-lubanga-weaknesses-iccmodel.
9 See Rob Williams, The Thomas Lubanga Trial – Dangerous for Children,
THOMSON
REUTERS
FOUND.
(July
10,
2012),
http://www.trust.org/item/?map=the-thomas-lubanga-trial-dangerous-forchildren (“The handing down of such a paltry penalty will surely give ammunition
to the courts critics and represents a difficult moment in the history of efforts to
stop the culture of impunity around gross abuses of human rights.”). See also
Thomas Escritt, Congo warlord jailed for 14 years in landmark case, REUTERS, July 10,
2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/10/us-warcrimes-lubangaidUSBRE8690C320120710; Mike Corder, Comments to Congolese Warlord To Prison
For 14 Years, HUFFINGTON POST WORLD (last updated, July 10, 2012, 5:36 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/10/thomas-lubanga-sentencedinternational-criminal-court-congo_n_1661028.html (reader reactions include the
following. “14 years is not long enough.” “Should have received life.” “Not long
enough.” “Should have got 14 years per child.”). See Comments to Congo warlord
jailed for 14 years in landmark case, REDDIT WORLD NEWS,
http://www.reddit.com/r/worldnews/comments/wbqzs/congo_warlord_jailed_f
or_14_years_in_landmark/, for further reactions from readers.
10 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant
to Article 76, supra note 2, at para. 37.
11 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 77, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 38544. The maximum imprisonment for a specific number of years
is 30 years. Life sentence is permitted only “when justified by the extreme gravity of
the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.” Id. at art.
77(1)(b). See also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Policing International Prosecutors, 45 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 175, 224 (2012) (arguing that Lubanga’s low sentence can be
attributed to a remedy for prosecutorial misconduct).
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committed.”12 The Congolese government likewise agreed that
Lubanga should have received a higher sentence, even though some
punishment is still a “positive signal” for peace in the region.13
Although Lubanga was sentenced to fourteen years of imprisonment,
he will receive six years credit for time served during the trial. Thus,
Lubanga will be out of prison in less than eight years. 14 Moreover, if
the ICC follows the practice of the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals of releasing perpetrators after they have served two-thirds
of their sentence, Lubanga will be released in a little more than five
years.
More significantly, despite all the ceremony and controversy15
surrounding the Lubanga trial, the sentencing judgment presented the
ICC judges with a significant opportunity to clarify the function and
purpose of international criminal law (“ICL”). Its first sentencing
judgment offered a seminal opportunity for the Court to elucidate the
role of the world’s first permanent criminal court with global reach.
Such clarity regarding the foundations of international justice is
essential to the operation of the court from start to finish, from
providing a vision to guide the work of the ICC and its Prosecutor to
facilitating consistency in punishment. It would also facilitate better
understanding of the Court’s decisions among communities and
individuals impacted by the crimes.

12 DR Congo warlord Thomas Lubanga sentenced to 14 years, BBC, July 10,
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18779726; David Smith, Thomas
Lubanga sentenced to 14 years for Congo war crimes, THE GUARDIAN, July 10, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jul/10/icc-sentences-thomas-lubanga-14years.
13 DR Congo warlord Thomas Lubanga sentenced to 14 years, supra note 12.
14 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant
to Article 76, supra note 2, at paras. 107-8. Lubanga is currently being detained at
the Detention Centre in The Hague. Situations: The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,
ICC-CPI.INT,
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%20
0104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/Pages/democratic%20republic%20o
f%20the%20congo.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
15 See Joshua Rozenberg, supra note 8. See also William A. Schabas, Victor’s
Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International Criminal Court, 43 JOHN MARSHALL L.
REV. 535 (2010).
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Unfortunately, the ICC’s first sentencing judgment is
disappointingly perfunctory regarding the fundamental pillars of the
system, leaving open a deeply divisive question that could jeopardize
the legitimacy and success of this endeavour. Moving towards clarity
on this question is the main goal of this article. It permeates every
critical decision of the ICC: the Prosecutor’s selection of cases and
defendants;16 decisions about the scope of the indictment and
witnesses called;17 the manner in which the trial proceedings are
conducted; judicial oversight of the Prosecutor’s decisions and
conduct;18 and the determination of a just punishment. Thus, the
questions and critiques addressed here will have continued
significance to both practice and theory in ICL. The experience of
the ad hoc tribunals indicates that both the defendant and the
prosecutor frequently challenge the trial chamber’s sentence on
appeal, and the Lubanga case is no exception. Thus, the reflections
offered in this article about the primary role and function of
international criminal justice has immediate and long-term
implications for Court’s work.
Drawing on the experience of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), this article argues that
idealism about what international criminal justice mechanisms can
achieve has lead to ideologically-driven judicial decision-making in
international criminal law.19 ICL idealism manifests itself in the belief
that international criminal prosecutions can achieve a wide range of
aspirations and goals, both international and local.20 According to the
See generally Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive
Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 (2012).
17 See WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES: JUSTICE,
POLITICS, AND RIGHTS AT THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS, 162-64 (2012) (discussing
the tension between the Prosecutor and judges at the ICTY regarding the scope of
indictments based on competing visions of the role of the Tribunal).
18 See generally Turner, Policing International Prosecutors, supra note 11; Jenia
Iontcheva Turner, Legal Ethics in International Criminal Defense, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1
(2010).
19 As used herein, ideology refers to a normative view that shapes an
actor’s goals, expectations and actions.
20 See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, paras. 38-39, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23,
16
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Secretary General of the United Nations, international criminal
tribunals pursue a number of aims including “bringing to justice
those responsible for serious violations of human rights and
humanitarian law, putting an end to such violations and preventing
their recurrence, securing justice and dignity for victims, establishing
a record of past events, promoting national reconciliation, reestablishing the rule of law and contributing to restoration of
peace.”21 Idealism about the institutional capacity of international
tribunals also found expression in the reports of Judge Antonio
Cassese, the first President of the ICTY and ICTR.22 Among the
institutions’ “Future Priorities,” Judge Cassese confidently stated that
the Tribunals were establishing an unassailable “historical record . . .
thereby preventing historical revisionism,” which he lauded as “a
most important function of the Tribunal.”23 In the case of the ICTY
in particular, Cassese added that in their judicial proceedings
international judges endeavored “to establish as judicial fact the full
details of the madness that transpired in the former Yugoslavia.”24
2004), http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf (identifying deterrence,
prevention, historical record, reconciliation, and reestablishing the rule of law and
peace as objectives) [hereinafter UNSG Report on Transitional Justice]; U.N.
Secretary-General, Fifth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, para. 296, U.N. Doc. A/53/219S/1998/737 (Aug. 10, 1998),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/AnnualRepo
rts/annual_report_1998_en.pdf (identifying prevention historical revisionism as “a
most important function of the Tribunal”) [hereinafter ICTY President’s Fifth
Annual Report]. See also Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal
Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 925 (2008) (discussing interpretation problems when
ICL becomes “imbued with utopian aspirations”).
21 UNSG Report on Transitional Justice, supra note 20, at para. 38.
22 ICTY President’s Fifth Annual Report, supra note 20, at para. 296.
23 ICTY President’s Fifth Annual Report, supra note 20, para. 296. Cf.
Patricia Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age:
Some Observations on the Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.
LAW & POL’Y 87, 116-17 (2001) (noting that “the findings of judges may not
produce the best approximations of history”). However, the factual accuracy of the
historical record established by international tribunals has been challenged. See
NANCY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2010).
24 ICTY President’s Fifth Annual Report, supra note 20, at para. 296
(emphasis added).
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Furthermore, canvassing the discourse surrounding international
criminal courts, the following ambitions are often associated with
ICL: retribution, deterrence, reconciliation, rehabilitation,
incapacitation, restoration, historical recording building, preventing
revisionism, expressive functions, crystallizing international norms,
general affirmative prevention, establishing peace, preventing war,
vindicating international law prohibitions, setting standards for fair
trials, and ending impunity.25 Ironically, such ambition, although
usually well intended, has actually contributed to the politicization of
the international judicial process.26

25 See e.g. SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES, supra note 17, at 96;
DRUMBL, REIMAGINING, supra note 6, at 151; Jan Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in
International Criminal Law: The Purposes of Sentencing and the Applicable Method for the
Determination of the Sentence, 4 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 87 (2001); GARY
JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 284 (2000); Turner, Legal Ethics, supra note 18; Minna Schrag,
Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 427, 428 (2004); Jean
Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 79 (2009);
Ruti Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL INT’L
L. J. 837, 857 (2005); Richard A. Wilson, Judging History: The Historical Record of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 908, 908
(2005); Ralph Henham, The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing, 1 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 64 (2004); Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6
MAX PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 4 (2002); Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International
Criminal Law, supra note 20, at 926, 994.
26 This is especially true when judges rely too much on reconciliation
ideology to justify their rulings. See Valery Perry, A Survey of Reconciliation Processes in
Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Gap Between People and Politics, in RECONCILIATION(S):
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 207, 208 (Joanna R. Quinn
ed., 2009) (stating that “‘[r]econciliation’ is a word rarely mentioned in good faith in
political discourse.”). See also Statements on the Rome Conference Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, 105th Congress (July 23, 1998)
(statements of David J. Scheffer, Ambassador at Large, War Crimes Issues, Head
of U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a
Permanent
International
Criminal
Court),
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/USScheffer_Senate23July98.pdf; Silvia A.
Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Role of the International Prosecutor, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 175,
181 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). See generally Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without
Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 583 (2007).
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My argument is that idealism about what international
prosecutions can achieve has distorted the condemnation of highranking perpetrators and just distribution of punishment among the
actors responsible for mass atrocities. This idealism sometimes
manifests in the socio-political context, such as the conviction that
international prosecutions will ipso facto lead to reconciliation. Other
times this idealism reflects traditional criminal law consequentialism. I
develop this thesis by examining the application of the goals of
reconciliation and deterrence when sentencing of perpetrators of
atrocity crimes. My conclusion is that, while both reconciliation and
deterrence are laudable aspirations, these ideologies have perversely
impacted sentencing such that the punishment too often does not
reflect the culpability of the individual.
These ideologies have been interchangeably described as the
purpose, aim, or objectives of international prosecutions,
justifications for international criminal punishment, or sentencing
rationales in international criminal law.27 Through unpacking the
sentencing jurisprudence, this paper breaks new ground by advancing
a theory on the relationship between ICL and consequentialist
aspirations. Thus, the article’s findings are also instructive to
international judges and others in the field for understanding how
aspirations such as reconciliation and deterrence have influenced the
severity of punishment at international criminal tribunals. The scope
of this paper does not permit a full treatment of retributive
approaches to ICL.28 It focuses primarily on a normative analysis of
27 See Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in
International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 417 (2001) (stating that
sentencing standards remain ill-defined); Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, International
Sentencing Law: In Search of a Justification and Coherent Framework, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV.
191, 253 (2006) (calling tribunal sentences “breathtakingly light”).
28
For a discussion of retributive justification for ICL, see Jean
Galbraith, The Good Deeds of International Criminal Defendants, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
799, 809-12 (2012). See generally Jens David Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory of
International Criminal Sentencing, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW 373 (Goran Sluiter & Sergey Vasiliev eds.,
2009); Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgements & International Crimes: The Disutility of
Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633 (2012). See Adil Ahmad Haque, Retributivism: The Right
and the Good, 32 LAW & PHIL. 59 (2013) and Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the
Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIM. & JUST. 55, 59-63 (1992), for broader discussions
on retributive theory.
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consequentialism, supported by an empirical and jurisprudential
examination of its influence on sentencing.
The perverse effects of this consequentialism frequently
surface in the sentencing jurisprudence, giving critics an easy target to
denounce international law as a political tool of powerful countries.
In particular, ICL’s opponents target the apparently erratic sentences,
the incoherent justifications, and the schizophrenic self-image of
international criminal courts as evidence that international justice
remains elusive in the current international paradigm, which is still
largely the product of power.29 In a trial process that frequently
appears opaque to outsiders because of complex facts, extraordinary
crimes, and unfamiliar procedural rules, the sentence is one feature
that is readily accessible to the affected communities. Unfortunately,
as illustrated by local reactions and criticized by observers, the
sentencing practice appears unprincipled, political and unjust.30
Sentences imposed by international criminal courts are slowly
becoming the system’s Achilles’ heel.31 This raises concerns even
29 See Mark Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The
Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 610 (2005) (observing that
international criminal law sentencing “still remains confusing, unoriginal,
unpredictable, and without the ordering benefits of a viable heuristic”) [hereinafter
Drumbl, Collective Violence]; OLAOLUWA OLUSANYA, SENTENCING WAR CRIMES
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 139 (2005) (describing sentencing at the
ICTY as a “lottery system [where] penalties are picked randomly” and as “a game
of Russian roulette . . . entirely dependent on a particular judge”); Ralph Henham,
Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal Court, 52 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 81,
82 (2003) (discussing “substantive irrationality and an absence of penological
justifications for international sentencing praxis”); Dirk van Zyl Smit, Punishment by
International Criminal Tribunals: Ideal Example for National Criminal Justice or Parody of a
Penal Process?, presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of
Criminology, Denver, USA (2003).
30 Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, supra note 27, at 193 (concluding that
international sentencing is “marked . . .by discretion and uncertainty”). See also
Danner, supra note 27, at 501 (criticizing the “coherency of international justice at
the ICTY and ICTR); Berislav Jelinić, Kevin Parker – The judge who freed the villains of
Vukovar,
NACIONAL
(Oct.
2,
2007),
http://www.nacional.hr/en/clanak/38490/kevin-parker-the-judge-who-freed-thevillains-of-vukovar.
31 See generally Shahram Dana, Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A
Theory on the Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 99 J. CRIM.
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among supports of international criminal tribunals. Yet, there has
been insufficient scholarly attention on ICL sentencing in academic
literature.32 This paper thus responds in part to this paucity.
Specifically, this article explores the impact of
consequentialist ideologies on international criminal justice, and in
particular on sentencing of perpetrators.33 Part I elucidates the
sentencing objectives advanced by the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals.34 Here the goal is twofold: first, to gain initial clarity on
what international judges purport to be the purpose of sentencing in
international prosecutions, and second, to track trends and shifting
methodologies by which judges construct this purposive narrative.
Two objectives appeared most frequently in the early jurisprudence:
retribution and deterrence.35 Reconciliation subsequently gained
LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 857 (2009) [hereinafter Dana, Beyond Retroactivity]; Mirko
Bagaric & John Morss, supra note 27.
32 Many thoughtful scholars have called for greater attention to be given
to the developing a coherent theory for sentencing atrocity perpetrators. See, e.g.,
Robert Sloane, Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”: The Evolving ‘Common Law’ of
Sentencing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 713,
733-34 (2007) (noting that sentencing has not yet become an integral part of
international criminal justice, but continues to be treated as an afterthought);
Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 610 (lamenting under-theorization on
this subject and calling for the need for evaluative research on international
sentencing).
33 They could also be understood as utilitarian rationales. Other decisions
influenced by one’s ideological vision of international prosecution include selection
of situations, cases, defendants, and charges; presentation of evidence at trial; and
punishment of perpetrators.
34 Referring to the ICTR and the ICTY, which were established by U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 955 and 827, respectively. See S.C. Res. 955, para. 1,
49th Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, para. 2, 48th Year,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
35 See Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para.
2128 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-05-87, Trial Judgment, para. 1049 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
20,
2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment, Vol. 3, para. 1144 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
26,
2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. 1T-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l Crim.
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Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Sept.
15,
2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/delic/tjug/en/080915.pdf; Prosecutor v. Milošević,
Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 987 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. 95-11-T, Trial Judgment, para. 484 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
June
12,
2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf;
Prosecutor
v.
Zelenović, Case No IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 31 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/zelenovic/tjug/en/zel-sj070404-e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/tjug/en/kra-jud060927e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/tjug/en/orijud060630e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para.
723 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, para. 458 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tjug/en/str-tj050131e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para. 817 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Jan.
17,
2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/tjug/en/bla-050117e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, paras. 142-50;
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 900-02 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
31,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
22,
2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 185 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
24,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 761-62 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
3,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, para. 848 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Jan.
14,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 58, 64 (Int’l Crim.
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considerable traction, especially after the sentencing of Biljana
Plavšić,36 correlating with the coming of age of plea-bargaining at
international tribunals.37 What started out as an ill-fated justification
for plea-bargaining genocide morphed to a general aim of
international prosecutions.38
Part II examines more closely the influence of deterrence and
reconciliation ideologies. The analysis demonstrates how these
consequentialist ideologies lead to injustice and perverse results in
sentencing. I argue that reconciliation should be abandoned as a
rationale for sentencing purposes, and deterrence should be limited in
its influence on the final sentence. Punishment influenced by these
two ideologies often distorts the individual perpetrator’s culpability.
This is not to say that international criminal justice cannot contribute
to these aspirations, but rather that such aspirations should not be as
influential in sentencing judgments as they have been thus far. As
Hannah Arendt concluded regarding criminal trials for mass
atrocities, after observing the prosecution of a former Nazi SS
Lieutenant Colonel: “The purpose of a trial is to render justice and
nothing else; even the noblest of ulterior purposes . . . only detract

Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
29,
1996),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj961129e.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R117, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 7-9 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
11,
1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj991111e.pdf).
36 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing
Judgment, paras. 66-70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/tjug/en/pla-tj030227e.pdf.
37
See NANCY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH (2007) [hereinafter
COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS], for further discussion on plea-bargaining at international
tribunals.
38 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T,
Judgment
and
Sentence,
para.
754
(Jan.
22,
2004),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kamuhanda/decisions/220104.p
df; Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, para. 288
(Dec.
10,
1998),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/furtj981210e.pdf.
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from the law’s main business: to weigh the charges brought against
the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due punishment.”39
I. SENTENCING OBJECTIVES ADVANCED BY INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
What justifies international criminal justice mechanisms like
the ICC and its recent predecessors like the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia? This is a question that the ICTY and ICTR never really
settled. Over time, they advanced an impressive array of “functions”
of international criminal courts.40 Some of these functions are similar
to justifications for punishment found in domestic systems, such as
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.41 Others are proffered as

39 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANALITY OF EVIL 253 (1964).
40 See supra, notes 19-20. See Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary
Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at 857-58; Richard A. Wilson, Judging History: The
Historical Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 27 HUM.
RTS. Q. 908, 908 (2005); Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law,
supra note 25, at 92-97. For a critique of sentencing rationales in international
criminal law, see generally the following: Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments &
International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 640 (2012); Mirjan
Damaska, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
329, 353 (2008); Robert Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 43 (2007). For arguments on how the approach of the ICTR
to jurisprudential issues regarding genocide can undermine Rwandan reconciliation,
see Jean Marie Kamatali, The Challenge of Linking International Criminal Justice and
National Reconciliation: the Case of the ICTR, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 115, 121-24 (2003).
41 Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2000).
See Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40. See also Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case
No. ICTR-95-1C-T, Judgment, paras. 108-09 (Mar. 14, 2005),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganira/judgement/050314.p
df; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence,
para. 28 (Sept. 4, 1998),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Kambanda/decisions/kambanda.
pdf.
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“special” or “unique” to international criminal law, such as
reconciliation and preventing revisionism.42
The vision of international criminal justice that is prioritized
will crucially shape the character of the ICC. Identifying a primary
justification for international criminal law, of course, does not mean
that ICL cannot make a meaningful contribution to other goals.
However, it is imperative that the ICC coalesces around a primary
justification for its work and set modest expectations. An idealism
that avoids prioritizing goals and eagerly pursues them all can only
delay the inevitable choice, as the experience of ad hoc international
criminal tribunals reveals, because some of these objectives are in
conflict. Eventually international judges are forced to prioritize. This
article hopes to inform that decision-making process by evaluating
the consequences of that choice through an examination of the
sentencing jurisprudence and practice of international tribunals.
A. Developing a Framework: Paucity of Positive Law
Almost exactly fifty years to the day, a three judge trial
chamber of the ICTY issued the first sentence by an international
criminal tribunal for atrocity crimes since the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East punished military and political leaders of
the Empire of Japan following World War II. When the three judges,
who were from France, Costa Rica, and Egypt, gathered in The
Hague, in a building that formerly housed an insurance company, to
deliberate on a just punishment for a war criminal, they found that
“[n]either the Statute nor the Report of the Secretary-General nor the
Rules elaborate on the objectives sought by imposing such a
sentence.”43 In identifying justifications for punishment and aims of

42 Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an
Empirical Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 463, 474-75 (2009).
43 Prosecutor
v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing
Judgement, para. 57 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj961129e.pdf. See also Uwe
Ewald, ‘Predictably Irrational’ – International Sentencing and its Discourse against the
Backdrop of Preliminary Empirical Findings on ICTY Sentencing Practices, 10 INT’L CRIM.
L. REV. 365, 379 (2010) (“The rather thin normative framework provided by the
sentencing provisions of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
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sentencing in international criminal law, international judges have
drawn largely from four sources: (1) the preamble of the Security
Counsel Resolution establishing the ICTY and ICTR; (2) penal
theories from national law; (3) the Nuremberg legacy, and (4) human
rights norms.
The preamble provisions of Security Council Resolutions
establishing the ICTY and ICTR are primarily intended to set forth
the legal basis for Security Council action under Chapter VII
pursuant to the U.N. Charter.44 It is doubtful that they were intended
as instructions for judges at the time of sentencing. Nevertheless, the
methodology of the International Tribunals has been to turn to these
provisions in their respective constitutive Resolutions to formulate
objectives of international sentencing.45 This methodology assumes
that the conditions required to trigger the Security Council’s powers
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter would suffice for developing
the justification and purpose of punishment of perpetrators of
atrocity crimes.46 It also assumes that the reasons supporting
international prosecutions are one and the same as the rationales to
guide its sentencing practice. In connection with establishing the
ICTY, Security Council Resolution 808 states:
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take
effective measures to bring to justice the persons who
are responsible for them,

ICTY does not offer a consistent philosophical approach to international
sentencing.”).
44 While there is a natural overlap between the justification for
international prosecutions and the object and purpose of international sentencing,
they cannot be assumed to be identical. Unfortunately, this distinction and its
relevance to international sentencing cannot be pursued in the short context of this
contribution. See H. L. A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2d ed. 2008). See also Margaret M.
deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 16, at 288-89 (making a distinction
between justifications for the establishment of the International Criminal Court and
rationales to guide case selection).
45 E.g. Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 38,
at paras. 753-54.
46 Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 38, at
paras. 753-54.
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Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the
former Yugoslavia the establishment of an
international tribunal would enable this aim to be
achieved and would contribute to the restoration and
maintenance of peace.47
Likewise, Security Council Resolution 955, establishing the
ICTR, states:
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take
effective measures to bring to justice the persons who
are responsible for them,
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of
Rwanda, the prosecution of persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law
would enable this aim to be achieved and would
contribute to the process of national reconciliation
and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.48
Both Resolutions speak to the Security Council’s
determination “to put an end to” international crimes, such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and “to bring to
justice” the perpetrators. Furthermore, the Resolutions proclaim the
Security Council’s conviction that international prosecutions “would
enable this aim to be achieved.” Presumably, “this aim” refers to
what was mentioned in the previous paragraph: “to put an end to
such crimes” and “to bring to justice the persons” responsible. Thus,
in the opinion of the Security Council, international prosecutions
would “put an end to” international crimes and “bring to justice” the
perpetrators. Moreover, the Security Council is also convinced that
prosecution “would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of
peace.” While some ICTY judges have relied on this particular phrase
to claim that the court’s purpose is to promote national

S.C. Res. 808, 48th Year, S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993). See also S.C. Res.
827, supra note 34. .
48 S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, at paras. 1-2.
47
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reconciliation,49 it is doubtful that this was the intent. This language is
boilerplate and appears in every resolution that invokes Security
Council’s enforcement powers under Chapter VII. It is necessary to
set for the legal basis of the Council’s use of Chapter VII.
Interestingly, while Resolutions 808 and 827 are silent regarding
reconciliation, Resolution 955 establishing the ICTR explicitly
mentions “national reconciliation” as part of the ICTR’s mandate.50
Although Tribunal judges routinely turn to their respective
resolutions to formulate sentencing rationales, their judgments do not
address important differences in the texts of these resolutions.51
B. Extraordinary Crimes, Ordinary Objectives: Retribution and
Deterrence
Although the sentencing jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals
has never adequately distinguished between a justification for
punishment versus the aims of punishment, the initial cases identified
two primary purposes: retribution and deterrence.52 A number of
years later, the Blaškić Trial Chamber added rehabilitation and
protection of society to the primary purposes of ICL sentencing, but
49 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43,
at para. 58; Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36, at para. 79.
50 S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, at paras. 1-2.
51 There is some concern that the judges may not have even noticed
these differences. For example, Judge Inés Monica Weinberg de Roca opines about
the “identical formulation” of resolutions establishing the ad hoc Tribunals. See Inés
Monica Weinberg de Roca & Christopher M. Rassi, Sentencing and Incarceration in the
Ad Hoc Tribunals, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2008).
52 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35,at paras. 79 (stating that “retribution and deterrence serving as the primary purposes of
sentence”); Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra note 38, at para. 288. For more recent
cases, see Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment, para.
142 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar 30, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/deronjic/tjug/en/sj-040330e.pdf (concluding that
the “[f]undamental principles taken into consideration when imposing a sentence
are deterrence and retribution”). For cases from the ICTR, see also Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 455 (Dec. 6,
1999),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganda/judgement/991206.p
df and Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, para. 20 (Feb.
5,
1999),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Serushago/decisions/os1.pdf.
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it did so without explanation or analysis.53 These “four parameters” –
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of society –
mirror the rationalizations for sentencing found at the national
level.54 However, scholars contest the applicability and relevance of
these rationales to international criminal justice.55 As the sentencing
jurisprudence developed, retribution and deterrence emerged as the
primary rationales in ICL punishment.56 Some observers criticize
See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, para. 761
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000),
http://icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf.
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (2007); David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction,
Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 575-77 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010);
Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute supra note 16, at 301-12; Damaska,
What is the Point, supra note 40, at 339-40; Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of
International Punishment, supra note 40, at 50-51; Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality,
Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 93, 116 (2002); Nemitz, The Law of
Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note 25.
56 See Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para.
2128 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010); Prosecutor v.
Lukić, Case No. IT-05-87 Trial Judgment, para. 1049 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009); Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T,
Trial Judgement, para. 1144 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26,
2009); Prosecutor v Delić, Case No 1T-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 15, 2008); Prosecutor v. Milošević,
Case No IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 987 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007); Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. 95-11-T, Trial
Judgment, para. 484 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007);
Prosecutor v Zelenović, Case No IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 31
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2007); Prosecutor v. Krajišnik,
Case No IT-00-39&40-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No 1T-03-68-T, Trial
Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006);
Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No 1T-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para. 723 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No
IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, para. 458 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor v Blagojević, Case No IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para.
817 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at paras. 142-50; Prosecutor v.
Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 900-02 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T
Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22,
53
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ICL’s focus on retribution and deterrence, hallmarks of a national
system’s response to ordinary crimes, as an unimaginative and
unoriginal response to atrocity crimes.57 Modesty, however, may be a
safeguard for a nascent international justice system. Ambitious social
engineering in the wake of mass atrocities is wisely left to other social
processes and institutions. Legalism has its limits, and those limits
should be respected. Its formality, rigidity, and obligation to protect
the rights of parties make it a limited agent of social change. These
meta-juridical goals require a matrix of social and spiritual institutions
working together to rebuild the fabric of society post-atrocity. When
other institutions and agents of society share this responsibility,
international criminal justice can play a modest but important role.
Of course, this is not intended to suggest that deterrence or
retribution are easy goals, but they are more familiar to a criminal
justice mechanism. According to the Tribunal, the goal of general
deterrence implies that “[t]he sentence imposed must also be
sufficient in order to dissuade others from committing the same
crime.”58 Individual deterrence, on the other hand, “refers to the

2001); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, para. 762 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v Kupreškić, Case
No IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, para. 848 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000); Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra
note 43, paras. 58, 64; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No IT-94-1-Tbis-R117, Sentencing
Judgment, paras. 7-9 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 11, 1999);
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 402 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
22,
2006),
http://icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Delalić,
Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), http://icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/celaj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal Judgment,
para. 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000),
http://icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment Vol. 3, paras. 1144-45 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
26,
2009),
http://icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.
57 See, e.g., Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 610.
58 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Trial Sentencing Judgment,
para. 136 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tjug/en/nik-sj031218e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT 95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 30
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specific effect of the sentence upon the accused” sitting in judgment
before the court.59 The “sentence should be adequate to discourage
an accused from recidivism.”60 In other words, the punishment
should discourage an accused from re-offending after the sentence
has been served and the accused has been released.61
The general jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber affirms
that the objective of deterrence, both general and specific, may
influence the sentence.62 However, it has also cautioned: “this factor
must not be accorded undue prominence in the overall assessment of
the sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the
International Tribunal.”63 ICTY trial chambers recognize both
specific and general deterrence have “an important function in
principle” and serve “an important goal of sentencing.”64 Some trial
chambers have applied the term “individual” deterrence when
referring to specific deterrence.65 Other trial chambers rejected the
applicability of specific deterrence in international criminal justice.
For example, although the Trial Chamber in the Dragan Nikolić case
recognized that specific deterrence “has an important function in
principle and serves as an important goal of sentencing,”66 it
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2001),
http://icty.org/x/cases/todorovic/tjug/en/tod-tj010731e.pdf.
59 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 135.
60 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2A, Appeals Sentencing
Judgment, para. 45 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 4, 2005).
61 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 134.
62 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-A bis,
Appeal Sentencing Judgment, para. 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Jan. 26, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-asj000126e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 185
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Nikolić, Appeals Sentencing Judgment, supra note 60, at paras. 45-46.
63 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at
para. 48.
64 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 134.
65 Id. at paras. 134-35.
66 Id. at para. 134.
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nevertheless found that specific deterrence had no relevance in the
case before it.67 The court did not elaborate on why it found that
specific deterrence has no relevance to the punishment of Dragon
Nikolić. The judges perhaps concluded that the aim of specifically
deterring Nikolić from committing crimes against humanity is moot,
assuming the circumstances that provided an opportunity for these
crimes to be committed, namely war, will not be present when the
accused is released.
Outside the tribunals, opinions are split on whether
international prosecutions have any deterrent value. Professor Payam
Akhavan argues that mass atrocities are the product of “eliteinduced” violence aimed at the acquisition or preservation of
power.68 Leaders are making calculated choices and trade-offs and
engaging in an immoral cost-benefit analysis. Akhavan makes a
compelling case that political power gained through fomenting ethnic
hatred resulting in mass violence can be discouraged. Threat of
punishment and international stigmatization “can increase the costs
of a policy that is criminal under international law.”69 According to
Akhavan, this can in turn impact the calculations of leaders
contemplating engagement in criminal policies such as ethnic
cleansing, genocide, or crimes against humanity as a viable policy for
sustaining power.70 Most supporters of deterrence in ICL
acknowledge that some individuals may not easily be dissuaded from
committing crimes when surrounded by routine cruelty. However,
they maintain that punishment can be an effective deterrent in
preventing such deviant contexts prior to their occurrence, or
recurrence, in post-conflict situations.71

Id. at para. 135.
Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent
Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 12 (2001).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Generally see the following: Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68;
Rolf Einar Fife, Penalties, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING
OF THE ROME STATUTE, 211-36 (Roy S. Lee ed.,1999); Dominic McGoldrick, The
Permanent International Criminal Court: An End to the Culture of Impunity?, CRIM. L.
REV., Aug. 1999, at 627; M. Cherif Bassioiuni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice:
67
68

51

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

Others are much more skeptical about the deterrent capacity
of international prosecutions.72 Professor Jan Klabbers, for example,
takes the position that ICL will not play a significant deterrent role
because human rights violators cannot be deterred.73 He argues that
the cost-benefit analysis underlying the deterrence argument
advanced by Akhavan and others cannot be applied to human rights
violators because they act mainly for political reasons. Because they
willfully engage in mass murder for political motives, Klabbers
considers them undeterrable. But there is no reason to assume that
political motivations are beyond deterrence. As Professor Isaac
Ehrlich observes, “willful engagement in even the most reprehensible
violations of legal and moral codes does not preclude an ability to
make self-serving choices.”74 In sum, while the scholarship is divided
on the deterrent capacity of international criminal law, tribunal judges
nevertheless consider deterrence as a central purpose of international
prosecution and claim that it is an influential factor in their
sentencing decisions.
C. The Lip Service to Rehabilitation
One sentencing purpose proffered by international criminal
tribunals that appears to have no impact on sentencing allocations is
rehabilitation. International human rights treaties encourage
rehabilitation considerations in national penology.75 While the focus
of these treaties appears to be on the administration of prisons and
the Need for Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1996), for support of
deterrence in ICL.
72 Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International
Criminal Law, 7 FIN. Y.B. INT’L L. 249 (2001) (disagreeing that human rights
violators can be deterred); Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 610 (claiming
that there is little or no evidence that punishment deters perpetrators of mass
atrocities).
73 Klabbers, Just Revenge?, supra note 72, at 253.
74 Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON.
PERSP. 43, 43 (1996).
75 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 10(3),
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
(“The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of
which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation”); U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., cmt., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.3 (1992); American Convention
on Human Rights, art. 5(6), Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
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the manner of enforcement of a sentence,76 the ICTY has purported
to consider such provisions when determining the length of the
sentence itself.77
In the early sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTY, several
trial chambers stated that rehabilitation is one of the “four
parameters” that guide international sentencing.78 However, it is fair
to say that rehabilitation was never highly significant79 in the
determination of a sentence and did not act as a meaningful
“parameter” to limit the sentence. This was made apparent in the
Trial Chamber’s judgment of General Blaškić.80 Despite
acknowledging “rehabilitation” as one of the parameters guiding its
determination of Blaškić’s sentence, and despite its own factual
finding strongly indicating the possibility of rehabilitation in the case
of General Blaskic, the Trial Chamber nevertheless decided to not
give these factors any weight, and certainly its forty-five-year sentence
leaves little trace of rehabilitation considerations, especially since
Blaskic was forty years old when he was sentenced.81 Such a sentence
suggests that the Tribunal was eager to send a strong signal of
deterrence, and that this ideology predominated its sentencing
considerations, even to the extent, some would argue, of trial
chambers distributing exemplary sentences or exemplary justice and
placing that foremost in their considerations. Taking caution that this
practice did not go too far, the Appeals Chamber stated in one of its
judgments that “this factor [deterrence] must not be accorded undue
76 See, e.g., MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, 241-54 (Kehl am Rheine ed., 2d rev. ed. 2005).
77 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Appeals Judgment, paras.
805-06 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf.
78 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment para. 761, 765
(Mar. 3, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf
(discussing rehabilitation).
79
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT 96-22-Tbis, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 66 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 5, 1998),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj980305e.pdf.
80 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 78, at para. 762.
81 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 78, at para. 762. See
Shahram Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić Sentence: Some Reflections on the Sentencing
Jurisprudence of the ICTY, 4 INT’L CR. L. REV. 321 (2004), for a critique of the Trial
Chamber’s sentencing analysis in the Blaškić case.

53

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

prominence in the overall assessment of the sentences.”82 It has
likewise explicitly pronounced that “rehabilitation should not be
given undue weight, confirming what was already implicit in the
sentencing practice of earlier cases.”83
D. The Rise of Judicial Idealism: Enter Reconciliation & Social
Engineering
The U.N. Security Council resolution establishing the ICTY
does not mention “reconciliation” as such. Neither does the ICTY
Statute or its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). Likewise, the
preamble and statute of the ICC avoid incorporation of reconciliation
as a goal of international prosecutions. Furthermore, reconciliation
ideology is virtually absent in the early practice of the ad hoc
Tribunals.84 Even in the first few cases involving guilty pleas and plea
bargains, international judges did not justify sentencing discounts in
terms of promoting reconciliation.85 The practice of justifying plea
deals in terms of reconciliation became popular only much later. This
is not to be confused with judicial unawareness of the potential
contribution that international prosecutions and just punishments
could make towards reconciliation in a post-conflict society.86 The
82

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at

para. 48.
See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, para. 806
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001)
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf
(stating
that
“although rehabilitation (in accordance with international human rights standards)
should be considered as a relevant factor, it is not one which should be given
undue weight”).
84 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note
41; Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43; Prosecutor v.
Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-958-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 13,
2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/sikirica/tjug/en/sik-tsj011113e.pdf.
85 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43;
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 41; Prosecutor v.
Sikirica, Sententing Judgment, supra note 84.
86 In the first annual report to the Security Council, the ICTY President
Antonio Cassese noted that international criminal justice mechanisms can promote
reconciliation and restore “true peace.” See President of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 1st Ann. Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
83
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initial judges of the ad hoc Tribunals were mindful of this potential,
but did not consider it as a differential principle for the purpose of
allocating punishment.87 This is most likely because reconciliation is
largely unmeasured, slow building and aspirational.88 Successful
reconciliation requires the mobilization of diverse elements of social
and legal order. Justice through criminal prosecution of violators of
community norms is merely one step towards that goal.
Although reconciliation is an important goal,89 the first
generation of international criminal law judges understood it could
not be captured by legalism or transformed into an operational rule
or principle.90 The very nature of mass atrocities problematizes
achieving grand ambitions like reconciliation because the widespread
participation in atrocity crimes creates deep complicity that is not
easily overcome through the narrow lens of judicially constructed
narratives via international criminal justice mechanisms. Moreover,
international judges were initially hesitant to act as arbiters of history
or to develop judicial narratives of the background to the conflict
that would serve as a platform for reconciliation.91

Yugoslavia in Accordance with Article 34 of Security Council Resolution 25704 annex (1993),
transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, paras. 14-18, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1007 (Aug.
29, 1994) [hereinafter Note of Secretary-General: Rep. of ICTY]; See also Wald, The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age, supra note 23
(discussing reconciliation through judicial adjudication).
87 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at paras.
57-66 (discussing factors influencing sentence allocation but not treating
reconciliation as a sentencing factor). See also Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age, supra note 23, at 117.
88 See Perry, A Survey of Reconciliation, supra note 26, at 207, 208 (Joanna R.
Quinn ed., 2009).
89 See Note of Secretary-General: Rep. of ICTY, supra note 86, at para. 16.
90 See Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Comes of Age, supra note 23, at 117 (concluding that “‘adjudication’ by ICTY of who
started, prolonged, or ended the war and why in the context of criminal
proceedings without the states themselves having input is basically unfair, or at
least does not contribute to future reconciliation”). See also Prosecutor v.
Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43; Prosecutor v. Kambanda,
Judgment and Sentence, supra note 41; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sentencing Judgment,
supra note 84.
91 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment,
para. 88 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998),
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Reconciliation subsequently gained traction in the Tribunals’
jurisprudence when an increasing number of convictions were
secured by plea bargains. However, with plea bargains, the historical
narrative of “what happened” was no longer constructed in open and
public courts by documentation and witnesses to the atrocities, as
was done at Nuremburg,92 but behind closed doors in negotiations
between perpetrators and international lawyers.93 In sentencing
judgments following a guilty plea or plea bargain, reconciliation
became a useful ideology to legitimize plea deals and justify
sentencing discounts.94 While actors within the system view
sentencing reductions as a normal outcome of plea bargains,95 local
populations, especially where plea bargaining is foreign to the
domestic legal culture, view the sentencing reduction as political
favoritism to a particular ethnic group, unwillingness of elites to hold
other elites accountable, failure to acknowledge the suffering and

http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf. (stating that
the “Trial Chamber does not consider it necessary to enter into a lengthy discussion
of the political and historical background to these events, nor a general analysis of
the conflict”).
92 Notwithstanding the fact that the “role of criminal tribunals as arbiters
of historical truth has been contested since the first serious efforts of international
justice, at Nuremberg and Tokyo.” See SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES,
supra note 17, at 157.
93 For concerns that plea-bargaining distorts the historical record, see
COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS, supra note 37, at 67, 207.
94 See Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36;
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Apr.
2,
2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/bralo/acjug/en/bra-aj070402-e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tjug/en/nik-sj031218e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
7,
2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/bralo/tjug/en/bra-sj051207-e.pdf.
95 Tribunal lawyers from civil law countries were initially concerned
about the practice of plea-bargaining. See Nancy A. Combs, Copping a Plea to
Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 139-41, 53
(2002) (reporting that judges and lawyers from civil law countries were
uncomfortable with plea bargaining at international tribunals).
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injustice inflicted on victim communities, or secretive deal-making.96
Thus, the entrenchment of reconciliation ideology in ICL
jurisprudence is largely a reactionary effort to legitimize the practice
of plea bargaining in the face of mounting criticism.
Crucially, for this push back to be successful, the goal of
reconciliation needed to be firmly anchored in the Tribunal’s
mandate. The problem facing the judges, however, was that Security
Council Resolution 827, establishing the ICTY, did not position
reconciliation as a teleological imperative.97 In fact, the resolution
does not even mention the word “reconciliation,” thus calling into
question whether reconciliation ideology should be considered as part
of the Tribunal’s mandate.98 Nevertheless, some ICTY judges took it
upon themselves to inject the goal of reconciliation into the court’s
mandate through a flawed interpretation of Resolution 827 that, even
if well intended, was beyond the Tribunal’s mandate and institutional
capacity. They attempted to situate the Tribunal’s role in promoting
reconciliation within Resolution 827’s reference to “contribute to the
restoration and maintenance of peace.”99 Unfortunately, this
methodology suffers from over dependence on the unlikely
assumption that, by such preambular declarations, the Security
Council intended to articulate a philosophy to guide international
sentencing.100 Even if we accept the assumptions necessary for this
interpretation, this language fails to justify the emphasis given to the
notion of reconciliation in ICL sentencing practice, resulting
frequently in perversely lenient sentences. Arguably, restoration and
maintenance of peace, in this context (i.e. criminal justice forum),
require the realization of justice by accountability for crimes and fair
punishment for wrongdoing. Thus, even assuming that reconciliation
is part of the Tribunal’s mandate, a difficult question follows: what
Cf. Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism
Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 658–60 (2010).
97 See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34.
98 See Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice, supra note 42, at 465
(challenging the merits of reconciliation and historical record building as goals of
international criminal justice mechanisms).
99 S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34, at 1.
100 The assumption also requires us to ignore the more obvious and
immediate purpose of such declarations in the preamble, namely to trigger the
Security Council’s coercive powers under Chapter VII.
96
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impact, if any, should the aim of reconciliation have in the
determination of a sentence for international crimes?
The complexities and difficulties of advancing reconciliation
ideology as part of the core mandate of the Tribunal were not fully
appreciated when it gained traction as a justification for the
increasing practice of plea-bargaining. Nevertheless, the notion of
reconciliation now appears frequently, but largely perfunctory, in
sentencing judgments.101 Despite its absence from the court’s
constitutive documents, the extant practice among ICTY judges is to
cursorily identify “promoting reconciliation” as part of the Tribunal’s
mandate. Thus, romanticism about international tribunals
“promoting reconciliation” persists even though it remains elusively
conceptually and pragmatically.102 While the Tribunals have clarified
how concepts such as “retribution” and “deterrence” are to be
understood in the context of international criminal justice, the notion
of “reconciliation” has remained undefined. Tribunal judges have
struggled to coherently develop and integrate this concept in their
decision-making and sentencing judgments.103 The lack of clarity on
what “reconciliation” means for international criminal justice,
however, has not inhibited trial chambers from relying on it when
allocating a sentence. Unfortunately, they have misapplied the notion
of reconciliation in their sentencing judgments. As discussed in detail
below, the ICTY’s method of realizing reconciliation appears to
contradict the aim of combating impunity, which is explicitly part of
the Tribunal’s mandate.
101 Prosecutor v. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
June
29,
2004),
http://icty.org/x/cases/babic/tjug/en/bab-sj040629e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Banovic,
Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 28, 2003), http://icty.org/x/cases/banovic/tjug/en/bansj031028e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Mrda, Case No. IT-02-59-S (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004), http://icty.org/x/cases/mrda/tjug/en/sj040331.pdf.
102 See Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice, supra note 42, at 465
(challenging the merits of reconciliation and historical record building as goals of
international criminal justice mechanisms).
103 See Kamatali, The Challenge of Linking International Criminal Justice, supra
note 40, at 121-24, for arguments on how the ICTR’s approach to jurisprudential
issues regarding genocide can undermine Rwandan reconciliation.
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E. Didactic Function of International Prosecutions: Affirmative
Prevention
Some of the objectives of punishment for atrocity crimes as
articulated by the ad hoc tribunals mirror those found at the national
level, such as deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and protection of
society.104 In addition, other considerations influence sentencing
allocations in the international context such as national reconciliation,
preserving history, and maintaining peace.105 Another important
consideration in the international context is reinforcing the values of
the international community.106 The work of international courts
contributes to internalizing norms, values, and interests protected by
international law in the consciousness and culture of national and
international actors. An important step in the evolution of the global
legal order is the crystallization of universal norms as more than mere
soft law provisions, but rather as binding law backed by punishment
for violations, especially norms embedded in human rights treaties,
international humanitarian law conventions, and the Genocide
Convention.
Referred to by some commentators as the didactic
function,107 in the context of international criminal justice this

Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 331, 339. See also
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, para. 458 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Jan.
31,
2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tjug/en/str-tj050131e.pdf.
105 See Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-T, Judgment,
para. 600 (Feb. 27, 2009),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CRukundo%5C090227.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1802 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Sept.
6,
2011),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tjug/en/110906_judgement.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Strugar, Trial Judgment, supra note 104, at para. 163.
106 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note
58, at para. 139; Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, supra note 55, at
95, 118-19, 127, 132.
107 Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 347. Related to didactic
function is the expressive function. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note
55, at 173-76; Luban, Fairness to Rightness, supra note 55, at 569, 576-77; Amann,
Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, supra note 55, at 95; Margaret M.
104
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translates into building awareness of the distinction between legal and
criminal conduct during war or armed conflict, whether international
or non-international in character. At first blush, this aim may appear
rather simplistic. After all, the line between legal and criminal
conduct is rather obvious when considering murder, rape, torture,
and other such crimes that occur in the context of armed conflict.
However, crimes committed in these situations are often precipitated
by direct and implicit indoctrination that dehumanizes the victim.
Coupled with the awareness that war crimes historically go
unpunished, these forces converge to disease belligerents with a
“culture of inverse morality”108 where killing, raping, and terrorizing
civilians becomes an accepted part of the warfare itself.
An individual’s inner sense of morality and repulsion towards
such brutality is overridden by peer pressure from immediate
comrades and superiors, and reinforced by inflammatory rhetoric of
national leaders. The perversity can reach a point where, far from
being considered wrongful, violence against “the other” is considered
a righteous deed. Thus, an educational or didactic function as an
objective of sentencing is particularly significant in the context of
international law.109 Moreover, it approaches the notion of deterrence
from a positive perspective of crime prevention. In addition to
building awareness of international law, international sentencing may
also help reinforce specific values that the international community
seeks to advance such as tolerance or the immorality and
wrongfulness of persecution of peoples on the basis of race, religion,
ethnicity or nationality. At this same time, it is interesting to
contemplate the moral dilemma and paradoxes of sustaining morality
in war. The evils that inhere in war problematize achieving a didactic
function through legalism, as does our extant framework. We outlaw
aggressive war, but once that rule is violated, we say killing of a
combatant by a combatant is lawful and killing of civilians is
deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 16; Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of
International Punishment, supra note 40, at 70-71.
108 See Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 7, 10, 12.
109 See Tom J. Farer, Restraining the Barbarians: Can International Criminal
Law Help?, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 90, 91-92 (2000); Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent
International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 292 (1998).
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unlawful. It is a position that is morally problematic, a legal fiction
that struggles to survive the realities of war.
Some international judges, notably Judge Wolfgang
Schomburg, have advanced the didactic function of international
sentencing for atrocity crimes.110 In sentencing a perpetrator to
twenty-three years of imprisonment for persecution as a crime against
humanity, Judge Schomburg opined that punishment by an
international criminal court “is intended to convey the message that
globally accepted laws and rules have to be obeyed by everybody.” 111
He further added: “this fundamental rule fosters the internalisation of
these laws and rules in the minds of legislators and the general
public.”112 According to this ideology, “influenc[ing] the legal
awareness of the accused, the surviving victims, their relatives, the
witnesses and the general public” and “reassur[ing] them that the
legal system is implemented and enforced” is one of the main
purposes of international punishment.113 Criminologists and criminal
law scholars have likewise embraced the “general affirmative
prevention” function of international criminal prosecutions.114
While international criminal prosecutions can contribute to
this educational or didactic aim, it is unclear how this rationale can
serve a differential principle to guide sentencing allocations. Even
international judges who embrace didactic aims accept this limitation

110 See Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58,
paras. 139-40; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, para.
902, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at para. 149.
111 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 139.
112 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 139. Other trial chambers have also followed this approach. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at para. 149.
113 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 139.
114 Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 7; Damaska, What is the
Point, supra note 40, at 334-35, 339, 345; Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International
Criminal Law, supra note 25.
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of the didactic function.115 Expressivism thus becomes a potential
consequence of international punishment for atrocity crimes, but not
a factor for allocating sentence severity. The ICTY’s leading
proponent of the expressive potential of ICL, Judge Schomburg,
prioritized retributivism over expressivism for the purposes of
sentencing.116 Expressivism operates under the umbrella of
retributivism. In fact, absent a firm grounding in retributive
justification, the expressive function loses its meaning and moral
force. The “culture of inverse morality”117accompanying atrocity
crimes does not take root for lack of awareness of the wrongfulness
of the conduct. Rather, the absence of accountability and punishment
in the face of pressures and orders from fellow soldiers and superiors
sufficiently weakens the individual’s moral resistance and motivation.
F. Judicial Schizophrenia? Between Punitive and Restorative
Approaches
As reconciliation ideology gained traction in the
jurisprudence, it challenged the tribunal’s rhetoric that retribution and
deterrence are the primary goals of sentencing for atrocity crimes.118
The jurisprudence, however, is unsettled as to which ideology is the
primary rationale in international punishment and which ones are
secondary. Consequently, inconsistency, indeterminacy, and
confusion persist from case to case when attributing priority and thus
115 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 123 (ruling that “the individual guilt of an accused limits the range of the
sentence”).
116 Id.
117 Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 10.
118 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, para.
402 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006),
http://icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Delalić,
Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-94-14/1-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 185 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
24,
2000),
http://icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment Vol. 3, paras. 1144-45 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
26,
2009),
http://icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf.
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the influence of these rationales in sentencing allocations.119 This
results not only in the appearance of unfair sentences but also in
arbitrary advancement of sentencing rationales. Thoughtful scholars,
like Professor Mark Drumbl, Jan Nemitz, and Professor Mirjan
Damaska, have observed that under-theorization and lack of clarity
among international judges regarding the purpose of international
criminal prosecutions has undermined the court’s integrity and
credibility.120 Nemitz criticizes international judges for engaging in “ex
post facto justification” designed to legitimize a pre-determined end.121
His “ex post facto” criticism merits further consideration, especially
regarding the advancement of reconciliation as both a grounds for
justifying the practice of plea-bargaining and as a mitigating factor.122
Likewise, Drumbl argues that the ad hoc tribunals “vacillate”
between retribution and deterrence, that is, between deontological
and consequentialist approaches to punishment.123 Closer
examination of the jurisprudence of the tribunals, however,
challenges this finding. In fact, both tribunals have been remarkably
consistent in proffering deterrence and retribution as the primary
aims of international punishment.124 International judges do not
ANDREW ASHWORTH & ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PRINCIPLED
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 167 (Andrew Ashworth et al.
eds., 3d ed. 2009) (arguing that identifying a priority among sentencing rationales is
essential to achieving consistency and justice).
120 See Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 330 (arguing that
“current views on the objectives international criminal courts are in disarray”);
Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 593; Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in
International Criminal Law, supra note 25.
121 Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note
25.
122 See infra note 133.
123 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 560-61.
124 See Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para.
2128 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jun. 10, 2010),
http://icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Lukić, Case No. IT-05-87, Trial Judgment Vol. 3, paras. 1141, 1145-46 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
20,
2009),
http://icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment Vol.3, para. 1144 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
26,
2009),
http://icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf; Prosecutor v.
119
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appear to vacillate between retribution and deterrence ideologies.
They do, however, vacillate between retribution and deterrence
together on the one hand, and reconciliation on the other. Thus, I
build on Drumbl’s theory and push the discussion forward by
Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 15, 2008),
http://icty.org/x/cases/delic/tjug/en/080915.pdf; Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case
No. IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 987 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec.12, 2007),
http://icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Trial Judgment, para. 484 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former
Yugoslavia
June
12,
2007),
http://icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf; Prosecutor v. Zelenović, Case
No. IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 31 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2007), http://icty.org/x/cases/zelenovic/tjug/en/zel-sj070404e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1134
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006),
http://icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/tjug/en/kra-jud060927e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Orić,
Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia
June
30,
2006),
http://icty.org/x/cases/oric/tjug/en/orijud060630e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para.
723 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Strugar, Case Trial Judgment, supra note 104, at para. 458; Prosecutor v. Blagojević,
Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para. 817 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005), http://icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/tjug/en/bla050117e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at paras.
142-50; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 900-02
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003),
http://icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
Case No. IT-96-23 & IT 96-23/1-A, Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
22,
2001),
http://icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf;
Prosecutor
v.
Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
20,
2001),
http://icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf;
Prosecutor
v.
Aleksovski, Appellate Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 185; Prosecutor v. Blaškić,
Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, para. 762 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), http://icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/blatj000303e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment,
para. 848 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000),
http://icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf; Prosecutor
v.
Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at paras. 58, 64; Prosecutor v.
Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35, at paras. 7-9.
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focusing on vacillation between reconciliation on the one hand and
the two joint factors of retribution and deterrence on the other hand.
In other words, the tension is between restorative and
punitive approaches. A number of factors have led me to prefer this
explanation. First, almost every sentencing judgment of the ad hoc
tribunals identifies both retribution and deterrence as the main
rationales of international sentencing.125 Thus, to argue that
international judges vacillate between retribution and deterrence
requires us to focus on one or two outlier judgments and ignore the
bulk of the jurisprudence. The argument is advanced by creating
three markers on a vacillation continuum: (1) judgments that treat
retribution and general deterrence equally, (2) others that cite
retribution as the “primary objective”, and (3) a third group that
considers “deterrence as probably the most important.”126
The problem is that these markers do not carry the same
weight or significance. When one plots all the cases on a continuum,
the overwhelming majority of cases fall into group one. Only a few
cases fall in groups two or three. Drumbl’s research confirms this.127
For example, only one case (the Čelebići Trial Judgment) can be found
to hold the space of the third marker, making it in my opinion more
of an exception rather than a true vacillation. Additionally, the Čelebići
Trial Chamber doesn’t even fully commit itself: it states “deterrence
probably is the most important factor.”128 Moreover, on appeal the
Appeal Chamber distances itself from this notion by explicitly ruling
that deterrence should not be given undue prominence in the
determination of a sentence and suggesting that retribution and

Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment
para. 33 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2002) (stating that
“The Trial Chamber is cognisant of the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, which
supports deterrence and retribution as the main general sentencing factors.”),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_simic/tjug/en/sim-sj021017e.pdf. See also
supra note 58.
126 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 560-62.
127 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 560 et seq.
128 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 799
(emphasis added).
125

65

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

deterrence are equal considerations.129 Thus, any value that the trial
judgment potentially offered for the retribution-deterrence vacillation
argument has been overruled by the Appeals Chamber.
The majority of judgments do not explicitly prioritize
between retribution and deterrence. Instead, they appear to treat
them as “equally important.”130 The following has become a standard
formulation found in these judgments (or language very similar): “the
main purposes of sentencing for these crimes are deterrence and
retribution.”131 Of course, whether these rationales in fact influence
sentencing allocations is another question entirely. However, I would
advance Drumbl’s thesis by focusing on vacillation between
reconciliation on the one hand and the two joint factors, retribution
and deterrence, on the other hand. This vacillation is more
problematic for ICL because it exerts a more substantial, yet
unpredictable, influence on the sentence.
Furthermore, it highlights the serious and real tension
between traditional criminal law functions (retribution and
deterrence) and broader aspirations such as reconciliation and
building a historical record. The vacillation argument takes new life
when we unpack the impact of reconciliation ideology on the
determination of a sentence. In fact, making more transparent the
role of reconciliation in atrocity sentencing may help identify factors
129 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 801
(citing Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at para. 48
(holding that deterrence “must not be accorded undue prominence in the overall
assessment of the sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the
International Tribunal”). See also Prosecutor v. Alekovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A,
Appeals Judgment, para. 185. (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24,
2000),
http://icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 90 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
2,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/nikolic/tjug/en/mnik-sj031202-e.pdf.
130 Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sep. 15, 2008),
http://icty.org/x/cases/delic/tjug/en/080915.pdf; Prosecutor v. Ntabakuze, Case
No.
ICTR-98-41A-A,
Appeals
Judgment
(May
8,
2012),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CNtabakuze%5CJudgemen
t%5C120508.pdf.
131 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 806.
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that contribute to seemingly incoherent sentences in international
criminal law. Granted, establishing this link is immensely more
challenging as reconciliation ideology is more influential in sentencing
judgments following plea bargains, thus introducing a whole set of
additional factors that complicate the sentencing matrix.
Nevertheless, as elaborated more fully below, the introduction of
reconciliation ideology into the determination of a sentence has
considerably increased indeterminacy and confusion in international
penology.
Before moving on to Part II, which focuses on deterrence
and reconciliation, I acknowledge that there are many other factors
that have been proffered as aspirations of international
prosecutions.132 As noted above, these include restoring peace,133
preserving a historical record of the atrocities to prevent
revisionism,134 ending impunity, protecting the rights of the accused
with exemplary standards for fair trials,135 halting active armed

132 See, supra text accompanying note 25. See also Zoe Pearson, Nongovernmental Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of
International Law, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 243, 271-81 (2006). See generally Vojin
Dimitrijevic & Marko Milanovic, Human Rights before International Criminal Courts, in
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: FROM DISSEMINATION TO APPLICATION (Jonas Grimheden
& Rolf Ring eds., 2006),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=920807.
133 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34, at pmbl.; S.C. Res. 955, supra note
34, at pmbl.; Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at
292; Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at
857.
134 Jonathan A. Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and Its Limitations,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 2070 (1993) (reviewing TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992)). However, the ICTY
seems to recognize that this function should not dominate the proceedings and is
not first and foremost among the objectives of international criminal prosecution.
Moreover, it likewise acknowledges that the criminal justice process is not ideally
suited for this function. Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note
52, at para. 135 (noting that the “Tribunal is not the final arbiter of historical facts.
That is for historians.”).
135 See Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, supra note
20, at 926; Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at
294.
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conflict,136 providing reparations to victims,137 denouncing racist
ideologies, disarming urges for revenge,138 establishing a narrative that
culpability is individual and not collective,139 and vindicating
international law.140 Many have been explicitly accepted by
international judges as part of the mandate of international criminal
tribunals.141 This overburdening of ICL has complicated the task of
international judges. It is beyond the scope of this article to address
all of these aspirations, given that many of the above objectives are
better understood as aims of trial proceedings rather than principles
for the purpose of sentencing allocations. Therefore, the following
sections address deterrence and reconciliation because they appear
frequently in the sentencing judgments.
II. PROBLEMATIC ENTANGLEMENT WITH DETERRENCE AND
RECONCILIATION
A common criticism of ICL sentencing is that the proffered
rationales for punishment are ill suited to atrocity crimes and that
136 See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34, at pmbl; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34,
at pmbl.; Ruti Teitel, Symposium: Milosevic & Hussein on Trial: Perspective on
Transnational Justice: Collective Memory, Command Responsibility, and the Political Psychology
of Leadership: The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 837, 857 (2005).
137 See Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 91; Pejic, Creating
a Permanent International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at 292.
138 See Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 91.
139 See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, at para. 1; Pejic, Creating a Permanent
International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at 292; Teitel, The Law and Politics of
Contemporary Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at 857.
140 See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34,at pmbl.; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34,
at pmbl. See also Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 91; Pejic, Creating
a Permanent International Criminal Court, supra note 109, at 292.
141 See Prosecutor v. Obrenovic, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing
Judgment , para. 111 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003),
http://icty.org/x/cases/obrenovic/tjug/en/obr-sj031210e.pdf
(finding
that
“restoring peace,” “establishing a historical record,” “countering denials,” and
providing victims with “some form of closure” are part of the mandate of
international criminal tribunals); Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment,
supra note 58, at para. 233 (Tribunal has the task to contribute to the “restoration
and maintenance of peace” and to ensure that serious violations of international
humanitarian law are “halted and effectively redressed”).
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they do not in fact guide sentencing allocations at international
criminal courts. Per the statutes of their respective courts,
international criminal law judges, who come from diverse countries,
cultures, and legal systems, enjoy wide discretion in sentencing. This
is also true for the International Criminal Court.142 Compared to its
predecessors, the ICC statute is more detailed, more rigid, and more
procedural in nearly every aspect of the court’s functioning,143 except
sentencing.144 The wide discretion in sentencing matters afforded to
judges at the ad hoc Tribunals failed to produce a unified articulated
vision on punishment in the context of international criminal justice.
The ICC might well draw important lessons in this regard. ICTY and
ICTR judges have been accused of first sticking their arrow in the
wall and then subsequently painting a bulls-eye target around it. In
other words, international judges have a predetermined penalty in
mind and simply mine among the rationales available to them under
their wide discretion until they find one most convenient to their
intended end. Although this may occur in some cases, it does not
fully explain the sentencing practice. In the following sections,
however, I will seek to offer a more comprehensive explanation.
A. Deterrence
The effectiveness of deterrence through punishment has been
well debated at the national level. Many are skeptical of this function
of punishment in the domestic context and have repeated their
skepticism in the context of international criminal justice.145 Professor
Tom Farer has noted that “[b]elief about the potential efficacy of
penal sanctions as vehicles for enforcing international law is a fairly
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 77 (b)(1), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544.
143 Judge Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court: From Rome to
Kampala, 43 J. MARSHALL L. Rev. 515, 519 (2010).
144 Shahram Dana, Law, Justice & Politics: A Reckoning of the International
Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. xxiii, xxvi-xxvii (2010). See Dana, Beyond
Retroactivity, supra note 31, at 905-08.
145 See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in
International Criminal Law, 12 FIN. Y.B. INT’L L., 249-67 (2001) (disagreeing that
human rights violators can be deterred); Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at
609-10 (2005) (claiming that there is little or no evidence that punishment deters
perpetrators of mass atrocities).
142
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straightforward extrapolation from the collective appreciation of law
enforcement at the national level.”146 He cautions, however, that
“[c]onfidence in this extrapolation is not universally shared.”147 Any
fair observer would have to concede that it is too early to judge
whether international criminal justice can have an effective deterrent
quality.148 If we consider Farer’s reminder that “[o]ne widely accepted
dictum of domestic law enforcement is that a high probability of
punishment generally deters more effectively than a very severe
sanction rarely applied,” then the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court can contribute to increasing the
probability that instigators and prime movers of mass atrocities will
be punished. International criminal law has long lacked the necessary
enforcement mechanisms to give relative certainty to punishment for
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.149
Moreover, with the current international criminal justice system
remaining dreadfully dependent on voluntary cooperation of states,
questions still remain whether the international system, in its present
state, can sustain a credible threat of certain punishment so as to
deter potential violators. Full treatment of these questions is beyond
the scope of this article, but we may begin the discussion by focusing
on a narrower question: to what extent does the objective of
deterrence actually influence sentencing considerations of
international judges? The aim here is not simply to consider the
rhetoric employed by international judges in their discussion of the
sentence, but to go beyond the rhetoric and examine the practice
itself.
All trial chambers without exception state that deterrence is
one of the primary objectives in international sentencing.150 Several of
Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 92.
Id.
148 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 608 (noting that
international criminal law “is still relatively young” and “in a nascent stage”).
149 See William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of
International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2002).
150 For rulings by the ICTY Appeals Chamber see, for example,
Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 806 (“[T]he
Appeals Chamber (and Trial Chambers of both the Tribunal and the ICTR) have
consistently pointed out that two of the main purposes of sentencing for these
crimes are deterrence and retribution.” (internal citations omitted)). For ICTY trial
146
147
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the early sentencing judgments even considered deterrence to be “the
most important factor” in determining a sentence for international
crimes.151 Sending a strong message that the international community
will not tolerate the perpetration of international crimes by political
leaders and senior military officials has been considered as part of the
Tribunals’ mandates from the very start. Particular importance was
attached to effectively deterring the so-called “masterminds” and
“architects” of genocidal policies and crimes against humanity.
However, deterrence is sometimes proffered as more than an
objective of international sentencing. According to some ICTY
judges, it is also the justification for punishment in international
justice. As a justification, it operates as the prime determinant of the
appropriate length of punishment. Thus, it is a factor that influences
the trial chambers’ determination of the length of the sentence.
Whether the goal of deterrence meaningfully influences ICTY
sentences can be challenged; nevertheless the sentencing judgments
ostensibly claim sentencing allocations to be deterrence orientated.
For example, in the Dragan Nikolić case, the Trial Chamber held that
deterrence was among the “[f]undamental principles taken into
consideration when imposing a sentence”.152 Thus, the objective of
deterrence was a factor that influenced the length of Dragan Nikolić’s
chambers, see, for example, Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra
note 52, at para. 142 (concluding that the “[f]undamental principles taken into
consideration when imposing a sentence are deterrence and retribution”). For cases
from the ICTR, see Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment
and Sentence (Dec. 6, 1999),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Rutaganda/judgement/991206.p
df and Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence (Feb. 5, 1999),
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/SERUSHAGO_ICTR-9839/SERUSHAGO_ICTR-98-39-S.htm.
151 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment,
para. 1234 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998),
http://icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf
(stating
that
“[d]eterrence is probably the most important factor in the assessment of
appropriate sentences for violations of international humanitarian law.”);
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, para. 761 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for
Former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
3,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf.
152 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para.
132 (emphasis added).
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sentence. This was not the first time that an “objectives orientation”
towards sentencing was adopted by an ICTY trial chamber to fix a
sentence.153 Both the Blaškić case and the Todorović case express the
view that the goal of deterrence may legitimately influence the
sentence. In fact, the sentencing jurisprudence of international
tribunals generally recognizes the “importance of deterrence as a
consideration in sentencing for international crimes.”154 The Todorović
Trial Chamber understood this to mean that the goal of deterrence is
relevant to determining whether an individual’s punishment should
be in the high or low end of the penalty range.155 Punishment
“imposed by the International Tribunal must, in general, have
sufficient deterrent value to ensure that those who would consider
committing similar crimes will be dissuaded from doing so. 156 The
Blaškić Trial Chamber likewise adopts an objectives-orientated
approach, namely general deterrence, to sentencing. But do these trial
chambers in fact follow it? In other words, do the results (i.e. the
sentence impose) resonate with deterrence philosophy? What, if any,
impact did deterrence have on the sentence of Todorović and
Blaškić?
Todorović’s crimes included murder, sexual assaults, beatings,
ordering and participating in the unlawful detention and cruel and
inhuman treatment of non-Serb civilians, ordering subordinates to
torture a person, ordering and participating in deportation and
forcible transfers, ordering and issuing directives violating the rights
of non-Serb civilians to equal treatment under the law, and infringing
on their basic rights.157 He was convicted of persecution as a crime
against humanity. He also participated in the forcible take over of the
non-Serb towns and villages in the municipality of Bosanski Samac.158
Todorović was the Chief of Police in Bosanski Samac and also a

See Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, supra note 81, at 326.
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para.
30 (citing Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment,
para. 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000).
155 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para.
30.
156 Id.
157 Id. at para. 9
158 Id. at paras. 12, 35.
153
154
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member of the Serb Crisis Staff.159 The Todorović Trial Chamber
considered “his abuse of such a superior position” and the “particular
cruelty” and “duration” of the beatings as an aggravating factor.160 As
mitigating factors, the Trial Chamber held that Todorović’s guilty
plea, expression of remorse, and substantial cooperation with the
Prosecution merited reduction in the penalty.161 For his crimes, the
Prosecution recommended a sentence of five to twelve years; the
Trial Chamber sentenced him to ten years imprisonment.
In comparison with penalties at the national level,162
Todorović’s punishment is notably lenient: ten years for a murder,
multiple lengthy and brutal beatings, and sexual assaults. Thus, while
recalling the Appeals Chamber’s rulings that deterrence is a legitimate
consideration when fixing a penalty, the actual sentencing imposed by
the Todorović Trial Chamber—ten years—suggests that deterrence had
little impact on the penalty. The Todorović Trial Chamber appears to
concede as much: “while the Chamber recognises the importance of
deterrence as a general consideration in sentencing, it will not treat
deterrence as a distinct factor in determining sentence in this case.”163
Apart from the general and indeterminate nature of this ruling, it
raises a more serious concern. In essence, the Todorović Trial Chamber
takes the position that it is free to ignore deterrence as a
consideration when fixing its penalty, despite the pronouncements of
the Appeals Chamber. Moreover, it gives no explanation for why it
chooses to not factor deterrence rationale into its sentence in this
case. The Trial Chamber may have a good reason for not giving
much weight to deterrence, but this reason is not made transparent.
The lack of transparency, in turn, can lead to criticism that the
Tribunal’s sentencing practice is unjust and arbitrary. Such criticism
calls into question the legitimacy of international sentencing and
undermines its expressive value. In subsequent sections, this article

Id. at para. 60.
Id. at paras. 59-62.
161 Id. at paras. 67-95.
162 See generally THE PUNISHMENT OF SERIOUS CRIMES: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE (Ulrich Sieber ed., vol. 2 2004)
(citing punishment reports of various countries).
163 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para.
30.
159
160
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advances a theory that arguably explains the Trial Chamber’s
approach here.164
What about the Blaškić Trial Chamber?165 If the Todorović case
serves as an example of a trial chamber paying lip service to the
objective of deterrence but not following that ideology in its actual
sentencing, what example does the Blaškić case provide? General
Blaškić was the first high-ranking figure to appear before the ICTY.166
At the start of his trial, the Tribunal had a meager eight alleged war
criminals in its custody. War criminals to prosecute were hard to
come by and the dockets where empty despite the fact that the Office
of the Prosecutor (OTP) had publically issued indictments for
seventy-five individuals.167 Among those in custody, Blaškić was not
only the highest-ranking defendant, but also the only one of any
significance.168 The Trial Chamber found the accused guilty of
persecution as a crime against humanity for ordering attacks on
towns and villages, murder, destruction of property and institutions
dedicated to religion or education, inhuman treatment, and forcible
transfer of civilians.169 He was also convicted of war crimes, but the
underlying acts overlapped almost entirely with the crimes against
humanity charges.170 In other words, due to the different
Arguably, the circumstances of Todorović’s case necessitated
powerful pragmatic considerations, leading to a plea agreement between the
accused and the Prosecutor. However, the low sentence is not fully explained by
them. After all, the Trial Chamber could have given a higher sentence (that of 12
years) and still satisfied the terms of the plea agreement.
165 The Trial Chamber was composed of Judge Claude Jorda (Presiding),
Judge Almiro Rodrigues, and Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen.
166 GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 4 (2000).
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 267.
The trial lasted more than two years. The Prosecution opened the trial on 24 June
1997 and completed its case-in-chief on July 29, 1998. Presentation of evidence by
the Defense commenced on September 7, 1998. Following a period of recess after
the Defense rested, the Trial Chamber heard closing arguments from July 26 to 30,
1999.
170 See ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS, VOLUME IV: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1999-2000, 659-66. (André Klip & Göran Sluite eds., 2002),
for further analysis of General Blaškić’s criminal responsibility.
164
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jurisdictional elements of crimes against humanity and war crimes,
the alleged criminal acts were charged as both.171 I have elsewhere
criticized the Blaškić Trial Chamber’s analysis of modes of liability,172
which was subsequently overturned on appeal in large part.173
For the judges in the Blaškić case, the key to determining a
“fair” and “just” sentence was not the gravity of the offense but the
“objectives sought” by international prosecutions and punishment.174
In their estimation, the main objective of international prosecutions
is deterrence.175 The commitment of the judges to deterrence is
asserted several times and unequivocally increased General Blaškić’s
sentence: “The Tribunal’s mission is to put to an end serious
violations of international humanitarian law.”176 In order to achieve
this objective, deterrence became “the most important factor in the
assessment of appropriate sentences for violations of international
humanitarian law.”177 Thus, the international judges here are clearly
adopting a consequentialist approach towards General Blaškić’s
punishment. The result was forty-five years of imprisonment; the

See William Fenrick, A First Attempt to Adjudicate Conduct of Hostilities
Offenses: Comments on Aspects of the ICTY Trial Decision in the Prosecutor v. Tihomir
Blaškić, 13 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 931 (2000), for a discussion on the Trial Chamber’s
findings on the charge of unlawful attacks and its relation to persecution as a crime
against humanity.
172 See Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, supra note 81. See also Prosecutor v.
Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at paras. 267-70.
173 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 502.
174 Id. at para. 761.
175 Id. at para. 762.
176 Id.
177 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 761
(quoting Prosecutor v. Delalić “Čelebići”, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)). Moreover, the Blaškić
Trial Chamber considered both specific deterrence and general deterrence as
relevant factors in allocating a punishment: “Apart from the fact that the accused
should be sufficiently deterred by appropriate sentence from ever contemplating
taking part in such crimes again, persons in similar situations in the future should
similarly be deterred from resorting to such crimes.” Id. (quoting the Čelebići Trial
Judgment at para. 1234).
171
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most senior figure in the court’s custody received the highest
punishment ever imposed by the ICTY at that time.178
The influence of deterrence in increasing Blaškić’s
punishment is demonstrated not only by court’s consequentialist
philosophy and severe sentence, but it is also illustrated by its
treatment of aggravating and mitigating factors and its
marginalization of factors relevant to individualizing the sentence. 179
In the Trial Chamber’s own words, in light of the deterrence
“mission of the Tribunal, it is appropriate to attribute a lesser
significance to the specific personal circumstances.”180 From the
perspective of the Trial Chamber’s ideology, this makes perfect sense.
It is a logical extension of its ideology because such factors are less
relevant to the goal of deterrence. The Blaškić Trial Chamber’s
treatment of “personal factors” and “the rehabilitation parameter”
only serve to underscore its deterrence ideology. The court’s own
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
21,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/acjug/en/fur-aj000721e.pdf (sentenced
to 10 years); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para.
191 (sentenced to 7 years); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra
note 62, at para. 76 (3) (sentenced to 20 years); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT95-10-A, Judgment, para. (7) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 5,
2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/acjug/en/jel-aj010705.pdf (sentenced
to 40 years); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment,
paras. 439, 466 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/acjug/en/kup-aj011023e.pdf (Josipovic
and Santic were sentenced to 12 and 18 years, respectively); Prosecutor v.
Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, paras. 1, 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf (The Trial
Chamber acquitted Papic. The Kupreskic brothers were sentenced to 6, 8 and 10
years, but all three were acquitted on appeal). See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No
IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23,
2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/acjug/en/kup-aj011023e.pdf.
179 In one way or another, the Blaškić Trial Chamber found reason to
reject the following mitigating factors: voluntary surrender (Prosecutor v. Blaškić,
Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 776); remorse (Id. at para. 775); lack of
direct participation in the crime (Id. at para. 768); duress (Id. at para. 769); material
context of armed conflict, i.e. disorder ensuing from a state of armed conflict (Id. at
para. 770); and co-operation with the Prosecutor (Id. at para. 774).
180 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 765.
178
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findings strongly indicate that Blaškić is well suited for rehabilitation:
he had no prior criminal record;181 assisted victims;182 was a dutiful
and professional soldier,183 and demonstrated “exemplary behaviour”
throughout the entire trial.184 The Trial Chamber even went so far as
concluding that it was “evident” that Blaškić’s “character is
reformable.”185 In sum, the Trial Chamber stated that rehabilitation is
a factor “to be taken into account in fixing the length of the
sentence”186 and further found, after detailed accounting, that the
defendant before them was reformable.187 Then, in what can only be
described as a 180, judges abruptly decide to do just the opposite of
the principles and finding they just laid out, declaring that these
factors will not be taken into account and are “non-existent” for the
purposes of fixing Blaškić’s sentencing.188
What is objectionable, even bizarre, about the judgment
authored by Judge Claudia Jorda (France) is not its rejection of
rehabilitation. In fact, I agree that rehabilitation is not a relevant
factor in fixing punishment for war criminals, although their
punishment may have that outcome. But if you are not going to take
rehabilitation into account when allocating sentences, then why make
a big show of it in the first place? Why declare that rehabilitation is a
relevant to sentencing allocation? Why engage in a lengthy discussion
that the defendant is reformable? Given this detailed analysis, we
would have expected the judges to provide a similarly detailed
explanation of why it is rejecting its own analysis. Instead, in a single
sentence, the Trial Chamber summarily concludes that factors
indicative of Blaškić’s reformability are “non-existent when determining
the sentence.”189 It is as though by the time the Trial Chamber

Id. at para. 780.
Id. at para. 781.
183 Id. at paras. 765, 780.
184 Id. at paras. 765, 780.
185 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 781.
186 Id. at para. 761.
187 Id. at para. 781.
188 Id. at para. 782.
189 Id. at para. 782 (emphasis added). The Trial Chamber gave two
reasons to justify its positions here: the “serious” nature of the case and the fact
that “many accused share these personal factors” Id. at para. 782.
181
182
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reaches the end of its analysis, it has forgotten the principles it set up
at the start.
Thus, although the Trial Chamber sets-out “four
parameters”,190 it appears only seriously interested in deterrence.
Nevertheless, despite the criticisms that may be levied against the
Blaškić Trial Judgment,191 it must be noted in its favor that, unlike the
Todorović Trial Chamber, it remains faithful to its espoused ideology.
It takes the position that sentences must reflect the object of
Tribunal’s mandate. It identifies deterrence as the main objective, and
it imposes a sentence commensurate with that objective.
In sum, both the Todorović and Blaškić trial chambers overtly
state that deterrence is one of the primary goals of international
sentencing and as such may influence the sentence. However, the
resulting penalty in the Todorović case suggests that the goal of
deterrence did not have much of an impact on the sentence whereas
it appears to have a substantial influence on the Blaškić Trial
Chamber’s sentence. The apparent inconsistency here is only
exacerbated by the Todorović Trial Chamber’s admission that it opted
not to consider deterrence ideology in fixing the penalty, adding a
degree of arbitrariness to the inconsistency. Why was Blaškić not so
fortunate to benefit from a suspension of the penalty enhancing
effects of deterrence ideology? I will argue that the both trial
chambers “got it right” intuitively, even if they could have done
better to articulate their approaches. Below I will offer a theory that
both explains the sentencing decisions of international judges and
also guides the application of deterrence in international criminal
justice. Before doing so, allow me to briefly identify two challenges in
general to realizing deterrence in international criminal prosecutions.

190 They are retribution, protection of society, rehabilitation and
deterrence. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 761.
191 For example, it has departed in both ideology and practice from the
general sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR that treat “gravity” of the
crime as the primary factor in determining a sentence. Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić,
supra note 81, at 330-32.
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1. Challenges to realizing deterrence
a. Practical challenges to realizing deterrence. – As noted above,
effectively deterring future “masterminds” and “architects” of
atrocity crimes constitutes a primary mandate of international
tribunals. In the early days of the ICTY, the main challenge to
realizing this mandate was that those in custody were not the
masterminds. They were low-level soldiers like Dražan Erdemović192
and Duško Tadić. High-ranking political and military leaders like
Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, Rakto Mladić, and Biljana
Plavšić who bear the greatest responsibility for the Yugoslavia
atrocities, were at that time beyond the reach of the ICTY.193 Nor
was there any prospect that these men would ever see trial and
punishment at the ICTY. The most senior ranking accused in the
custody of the ICTY in the early days was Tihomir Blaškić, who had
just been made a colonel at the time of the war. Although Blaškić was
by no means a “mastermind” of the policies that lead to the
atrocities, nor even among the high-ranking decisions makers within
the Bosnia Croat or Croatian power structure, he was nevertheless
the highest-ranking person before the ICTY. If the ICTY wanted to
send a message of deterrence through severe punishment of senior
political and military officials, who lead the masses of people into a
bloodbath, then the Tribunal would need to impose a severe sentence
on Blaškić. It did so without hesitation.

192 Croat is First to be Convicted by Balkan War Crimes Panel, N.Y TIMES, June
1,
1996,
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/01/world/croat-is-first-to-beconvicted-by-balkan-war-crimes-panel.html.
193 Milosevic was surrendered to the Tribunal on June 28, 2001.
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC CASE INFORMATION SHEET, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE
FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/cis/en/cis_milosevic_slobodan
_en.pdf. Karadzic was surrendered on July 30, 2008. RADOVAN KARADZIC CASE
INFORMATION SHEET, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/cis/en/cis_karadzic_en.pdf. Mladic was
surrendered on May 31, 2011. RAKTO MLADIC CASE INFORMATION SHEET, INT’L
CRIM.
TRIB.
FOR
THE
FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/cis/en/cis_mladic_en.pdf. Biljana Plavšić
voluntarily surrendered to the ICTY on January 10, 2001. BILJANA PLAVSIC CASE
INFORMATION SHEET, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/cis/en/cis_plavsic+en/pdf.
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b. Theoretical challenges to realizing deterrence. – To further examine
the role and relevance of deterrence to international sentencing at the
individual level, it may be helpful to place perpetrators of atrocities
crimes in two broad categories of offenders: low-level perpetrators
and high-level perpetrators. Regarding the former, contextual
considerations, such as a culture of inverse morality as noted by other
authors,194 challenges the appropriateness and effectiveness of
deterrence. Although here, the didactic function of ICL or
“affirmative general prevention” can play a role in preventing such a
culture from taking root.195 Deterrence, however, may be better
suited to sentencing in relation to the latter group of high-level
perpetrators. If we assume the model of the “rational calculating”
criminal, then from a utilitarian perspective, punishment can have a
deterrent effect by tipping the scales on the cost-benefit analysis196 so
that “crime does not pay.” Naturally, more contextual and factual
research needs to be preformed in order to firm up this
proposition.197 But there is a sufficient basis, grounded in facts and
the realities of the rise of such atrocities, to say that many of the
high-level leaders, who are responsible for instigating the
circumstance that lead to such dire calamities and cataclysms,
deliberately and calculatedly promulgated doctrine of racial hatred or
extreme nationalism and cynically propagated such divisive currencies
to ascend to political power. Punishment of such persons can
demonstrate that there is a cost, in terms of a severe penalty, for
those that seek to gain political power through tactics that endanger
the stability of society. The punishment must outweigh any political
gains.
2. Perpetrator hierarchy and deterrence
Even if one disagrees with this approach, it may explain what
the Tribunals are doing. As demonstrated above, some ICTY trial

See Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 7.
Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note
25, at 90, 110-11.
196 See generally, Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 8.
197 Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International
Criminal Law, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 249, 2001 (disagreeing that human rights
violators can be deterred).
194
195
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chambers took a consequentialist approach towards punishment of
human right violators, focusing on deterrence. While the rhetoric on
deterrence is bold and broad, the practice reveals a more subtle and
sophisticated nuance. There is some evidence that international
judges weigh the relevance of deterrence in determining the penalty
for a particular perpetrator based on that person’s position of
authority. This is illustrated through the examples of the punishment
of Blaškić and Todorović. Both trial chambers declare the objective
of deterrence to be a factor in their sentencing approach. The Blaškić
Trial Chamber in particular appears wholly fixated on deterrence, but
a closer reading reveals that its myopic consequentialism is induced
by the presence of a high-ranking perpetrator. It even declares that
“the Tribunal was set up to punish according to the accused’s level of
responsibility.”198 Thus, the judges in the Blaškić case approached the
deterrence factor with regard to the Blaškić’s role and position in the
overall hierarchy that was responsible for the atrocities.
Moreover, regarding the influence of general deterrence on
punishment, with a few exceptions, ICL sentencing practice indicates
that the objective of general deterrence will increase the sentence of a
high-ranking perpetrator, but generally has little affect on the
sentence of rank and file soldiers, unless they demonstrated notorious
cruelty or exceptional brutality. This explains to some extent why
Todorović received a very low sentence. Boiler plate rhetoric aside,
international judges do not actually seem to be very convinced that
deterrence is relevant or effective in the case of rank and file, low
level perpetrators. A more cynical view attributes Todorović’s low
punishment to the embarrassing situation the ICTY found itself in
when the United Nations sanctioned peacekeeping force, S-FOR,199
refused to comply with the Court’s order to turn over documents
relevant to his arrest and transfer to The Hague.200 This perspective,
however, does not entirely account for how low the Trial Chamber
went with Todorović’s sentence because the judges could have given
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 808.
S-FOR stands for “Stabilization Force” which was led by NATO but
established by United Nations Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1088 on
December 12, 1996.
200 Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 118-22; See discussion infra
Section II(B)(2).
198
199
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a higher sentence and still remained within the scope and terms of
the plea agreement.
Moreover, the point can be established by other examples less
tainted by cynicism. Consider for example the ICTR’s punishment of
Mikaeli Muhimana, the conseiller of the Gishyita secteur.201 The Trial
Chamber found that he “occupied a position of influence in the
community” and that instead of using his position to protect the
defenseless, he actively participated in the attacks against Tutsi
civilians seeking refuge in churches and hospitals. Muhimana raped
and killed women who he believed to be Tutsi in the most gruesome
and brutal manner.202 In sentencing him to imprisonment for the
remainder of his life, the Trial Chamber found a host of aggravating
factors such as his position of influence,203 the fact that the victims
were seeking refuge,204 the young age (fifteen years old) of one of the
rape victims,205 presence of others during the rapes,206 intentionally
increasing the suffering of the victim,207 public humiliation,208
savagery,209 and the fact that the victim was pregnant.210 Some of
these aggravating factors could arguably be characterized as factors
pertaining to the gravity of the offense. In fact, in its recent
201 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Summary of
Judgment,
paras.
3,
4
(Apr.
28,
2005),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CMuhimana%5Cjudgement
%5C280405summary.pdf.
202 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment and
Sentence,
paras.
606-15
(Apr.
28,
2005),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Muhimana/decisions/muhimana
280505.pdf. (In one incident, Muhimana “used a machete to cut the pregnant
woman Pascasie Mukaremera from her breasts down to her genitals and remove
her baby, who cried for some time before dying. After disembowelling the woman,
the assailants accompanying Muhimana then cut off her arms and stuck sharpened
sticks into them.”).
203 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 202, at
para. 604.
204 Id. at para. 605.
205 Id. at para. 607.
206 Id. at para. 609.
207 Id. at para. 610.
208 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 202, at
para. 611.
209 Id. at para. 612.
210 Id. at para. 612.
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sentencing judgment, the ICC treated similar factors as relevant only
to its assessment of “gravity” and rejected them as aggravating
factors, which was how the ICC Prosecutor characterized them.211 In
the context of the ICTR’s sentencing provisions, which give
international judges “unfettered discretion” in fashioning a penalty,
the distinctive functions of “gravity of the offense” and “aggravating
circumstances” are somewhat marginalized, so long as the trial
chamber is careful to not consider the same factor twice. However,
the lack of doctrinal and theoretical clarity on the intersection
between and distinctiveness of “gravity” and “aggravating
circumstance” will prove more problematic for the ICC because, inter
alia, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) require the
existence of at least one aggravating circumstance before the court
can impose life imprisonment.212
Both the Prosecution and the Trial Chamber position
Muhimana as a “conseiller” and “businessman.”213 The Trial Chamber
found that the defendant’s status in the society where he lived
constituted an aggravating factor.214 Generally speaking, persons in
positions of public authority who abuse their positions and the
powers entrusted to them to commit or advance mass atrocities merit
greater punishment because such perpetrators are more dangerous in
that they cast a wider net of harm and destruction. The enhanced
punishment is also justified because they have breached a sacred trust
by employing their position and the machineries at their disposal to
victimize those to whom they had a duty to serve and protect. These
factors have a direct impact on the criminality. The jurisprudence of
the ICTY and ICTR recognizes these principles by holding “superior
position,” or in some cases, “abuse of authority” as an aggravating
factor. The ICTR Trial Chamber viewed Muhimana as a high-level

211 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant
to Article 76, supra note 2, at paras. 92-9.
212 INT’L CRIM CT. R. P. & EVID. 145 (3) (2003).
213 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 202, at
paras. 596, 604.
214 Id. at paras. 595-96.
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and influential person and, like the ICTY’s Blaškić Trial Chamber,
imposed a severe punishment.215
In Muhimana case, however, the Defense should have
challenged the Prosecutor’s submission that his status should be an
aggravating factor. In this case, it is unclear how his “status”
aggravated his criminality. The Prosecution does not argue that
Muhimana held any political position or that his “status” lead to an
abuse of authority. The Prosecution only submits that “his close
associations with senior civil servants and prominent business people,
and his popularity . . . further enhanced his ‘status’.”216 The Trial
Chamber accepted this argument and aggravating his penalty because
of his “status.”217 However, while his associations and popularity may
have enhanced his “status,” the Trial Chamber does not explain how
it enhances his culpability in relation to his crimes. The Muhimana
Trial Chamber found no mitigating circumstances,218 and the Defense
surprising made no submissions on this point.219
In sum, international judges at the ad hoc Tribunals boldly
proclaim the deterrent function of international criminal
prosecutions.220 They demonstrate confidence in the deterrent
capacity of international courts, and state that the goal of deterrence
influences their determination of penalties.221 This obtuse rhetoric
215
216
217
218

Id. at para. 618.
Id. at para. 596.
Id. at para. 604.
Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 202, at

para. 616.
Id. at para. 602.
See Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, para. 441
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/acjug/en/gal-acjud061130.pdf.
See
also
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, paras. 891, 900, 902 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
31,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf.
221 See Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36, at
para. 24; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Judgment, paras. 775-77
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/acjug/en/090317.pdf. See also Prosecutor v.
Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, paras. 900-02 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003),
219
220
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obfuscates the actual sentencing practice, which demonstrates greater
nuance. The general sentencing jurisprudence reveals that the goal of
deterrence has little impact on increasing the penalty of low-level war
criminals. Deterrence plays a more significant role in enhancing the
penalty for a high-level perpetrator or those that had significant
power or influence. This unspoken distinction mirrors the position of
some observers that rank and file common persons cannot be easily
deterred when surrounded by the chaos of systematic criminality
during war.222 Instead, the goal of deterrence should focus ICL’s

http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj030731e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 761; Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. 1T04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Sept
15,
2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/delic/tjug/en/080915.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, para. 1144 ( Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
26,
2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e3of4.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1049 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
20,
2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_lukic_sredoje_lukic/tjug/en/090720_j.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para. 2128 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
June
10,
2010),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
22,
2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para. 817 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Jan.
17,
2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/tjug/en/bla-050117e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Strugar, Trial Judgment, supra note 104, at para. 458; Prosecutor v.
Limaj, Case No. 1T-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para. 723 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former
Yugoslavia
November.
30,
2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Orić, Case No. 1T-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/tjug/en/orijud060630e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35,at paras.
7-9; Prosecutor v Kupreški, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, para. 848 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Jan.
14,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf.
222 However, this is by no means universal. In the both the Yugoslav and
Rwandan atrocities, there are a number of examples of great human moral courage
resisting the systematic criminality. See Bernard Muna, The ICTR Must Achieve Justice
for Rwandans, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1481 (1998).
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punitive sting for leaders who used their power and influence to
execute criminal policies.
B. Reconciliation
One unresolved question regarding the primary role of
international criminal justice mechanisms is to what extent the ICC
should allow reconciliation ideology to influence its decision-making.
Prioritizing reconciliation (a restorative focus) over retribution and
deterrence (punitive focuses) may alter decisions by the ICC
Prosecutor at the front end, for example in case and situation
selection, as well as decisions by judges at the back end, for example
when sentencing. The experience of the ICTY shows that the
absence of a coherent theoretical underpinning for the application of
reconciliation ideology has lead to some troubling results. To
illustrate this we may consider the following cases: Erdemovic,223
Jelišić,224 Sikirica,225 Plavšić,226 Bralo,227 and Nikolić.228
Since 2001, the practice of plea-bargaining increased
exponentially in international prosecutions.229 At the same time,

Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43;
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Oct.
7,
1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-aj971007e.pdf.
224
Prosecutor v. Jelišić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
14,
1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug/en/jel-tj991214e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Jelišić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 5, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/acjug/en/jelaj010705.pdf.
225 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 84.
226 Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/tjug/en/pla-tj030227e.pdf.
227 Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94; Prosecutor
v. Bralo, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 94.
228 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94; Prosecutor
v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Feb.
4,
2005),
http://icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/acjug/en/nik-jsa050204e.pdf.
229 See COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS, supra note 37.
223
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reconciliation ideology gained traction among international judges.230
To appreciate this phenomenon, it is necessary to start with the early
practice at the Tribunal in relation to both plea-bargaining and
reconciliation. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that guilty
pleas at international tribunals come in two varieties: “unilateral”
guilty pleas and bargained-for guilty pleas. The latter consists of
situations where the defense engages in negotiations with the
Prosecutor for the defendant’s admission to the certain charges in
exchange for the Prosecutor’s agreement to dismiss other charges
and/or allegations from the indictment (charge reduction), and/or to
recommend a lenient sentence, or to refrain from seeking a particular
(high) penalty (sentence reduction). It excludes situations where the
accused accepts his or her criminal responsibility and enters a guilty
plea without negotiating for charge or sentence reduction. In these
guilty pleas, no bargaining or negotiating is needed to secure the
defendant’s admission. In other words, not all guilty pleas are the
result of plea-bargaining.231
1. Early practice: reconciliation ideology has no influence on sentencing.
In the first ten years of the ICTY’s operations, only two cases
were disposed of by plea bargaining: the Todorović case and the Sikirica
case.232 Each contained some element out of the ordinary. A third
Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 111 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003),
http://icty.org/x/cases/obrenovic/tjug/en/obr-sj031210e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 233; Prosectuor v. Mrða,
Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 78 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrda/tjug/en/sj040331.pdf; Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgment,
para. 76 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004),
http://icty.org/x/cases/miodrag_jokic/tjug/en/jok-sj040318e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Rajic, Case No. IT-95-12-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 146 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
May
8,
2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/rajic/tjug/en/raj-tj0060508e.pdf.
231 An illustrative example is the case of Dražan Erdemović and his
immediate plea of guilt at his initial appearance. See Erdemović, Dražen, HAGUE J.
PORTAL, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6096 (last visted Oct.
13, 2013). See also Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43. .
232 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 11 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
14,
1999),
230
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case—against Goran Jelišić, a camp commander—involved the
accused pleading guilty to all counts but one—genocide—and the
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) continued to trial on the remaining
count. Thus, his plea does not appear to have been bargained for. All
three cases underscore an OTP policy against plea-bargaining,
especially when the accused has been charged with genocide.
Reconciliation ideology is virtually non-existent as a sentencing factor
in these early cases.233
In the Jelišic case, a camp commander pled guilty to thirty-one
individual counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The
only charge that Jelišić refused to accept responsibility for was a
single charge of genocide.234 Given that the OTP had substantial
evidence to prove genocide, it refused to drop the charge from the
indictment. Much to the disappointment of the judges, the
Prosecution insisted on proceeding to trial against Jelišić for the
single count of genocide, even though Jelišić was already facing a very
severe prison sentence resulting from his guilty plea to very serious
crimes, including multiple murders committed in the most chilling
and wicked manner. The tension between the ICTY judges and the
Prosecutor was plainly evident during the course of the trial. The
judges were frustrated at what they considered wasteful expenditure
of time and resources on a trial of a relatively minor figure that had
already pled guilty to crimes against humanity and war crimes grave
enough to merit a forty-year sentence. The OTP was equally
determined to try Jelišić for genocide so that the record would reflect
what it believed was the true scope of his culpability. The policy
behind the OTP’s uncompromising stance was the idea that the
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug/en/jel-tj991214e.pdf (pleading guilty on
October 29,1998); Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at
para. 5 (pleading guilty on December 13, 2000); Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sententing
Judgment, supra note 84, at paras. 12-15 (pleading guilty on September 19, 2001;
September 19, 2001; and September 4, 2001, respectively). As explained above, the
Erdemović case is not included among these cases because Erdemović pled guilty
at his initial appearance.
233 See also Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43.
234 Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, “Brcko”
Indictment: Goran Jelisic Pleads Guilty to the Majority of the Charges in the
Second
Amended
Indictment,
JL/PIU/357-E
(Oct.
29,
1998),
http://www.icty.org/sid/7624.
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crime of genocide carries too much significance to be dropped simply
because the accused has accepted responsibility for other crimes. The
Jelišić case demonstrates the OTP’s unwillingness to provide the
accused with any concession by way of charge or penalty reduction
for his guilty plea. As noted above, however, it would be incorrect to
characterize Jelišić’s guilty plea as a plea bargain. Jelišić sua sponte
accepted responsibility for all the charges against him except the
crime of genocide.235 No bargaining or negotiating was needed to
secure his admission to the other crimes.
Stevan Todorović and Biljana Plavšić, on the other hand,
represent cases of carefully crafted plea bargains. Todorović muscled
a highly favorable plea deal out of the Prosecutor. His Defense team
successfully obtained an order from the ICTY directing the NATO
led S-FOR to cooperate with the defendant by producing documents
and making senior officials available as witnesses for his hearing
challenging the lawfulness of his arrest, detention, and transfer to
The Hague by S-FOR. Todorović was living comfortably in his
hometown in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and woke up
one morning to find himself hooded and handcuffed in a helicopter
on his way to S-FOR’s Tuzla Air Force Base.236 One version of the
events attributes his capture to four bounty hunters.237 According to
Todorović, his kidnapping was a clandestine operation orchestrated
by S-FOR in which he was hooded, beaten, kidnapped, and taken to
the boarder of Bosnia Herzegovina to be subsequently transferred by
S-FOR to the ICTY.238
Claiming that his arrest was illegal and violated fundamental
human rights, Todorović sought to compel S-FOR to hand over

Id.
Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Decision
on Todorovic’s Motion For Judicial Assistance, XT/ P.I.S./ 636-e (Oct. 20, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/sid/7811.
237 See, Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 118.
238 Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 118-19. See also Susan Lamb,
Illegal Arrest and the Jurisdiction of the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE
AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 27-35
(Richard May et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the events surrounding Todorovic’s
arrest and transfer to the ICTY).
235
236
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documents and witnesses to support his allegations.239 The trial
judges ordered the North Atlantic Council, thirty-three individual
States, and S-FOR itself to disclose specific documents. In a bold
move, they also ordered the Commanding General of S-FOR, Eric
Shinseki of the United States, to appear as a witness in his individual
capacity at the hearing. All parties promptly refused to comply with
the order, citing possible security risks to an on-going military and
peacekeeping operation.240 The standoff was an embarrassment to the
United Nations and the ICTY—a U.N. created peacekeeping force
flatly refused to comply with an order of a U.N. judicial body. Would
power submit to the law? NATO’s non-compliance with the ICTY
order seemly contradicted the principle that all must obey the law.
The ICTY—in fact the entire enterprise of international criminal
justice—was predicated on the notion of accountability and that no
one was above the law. It was a direct challenge to the authority of
the court from an unexpected source, something ICTY defendants
had been doing since the first time the court asserted jurisdiction.241
With his motion threatening the legitimacy of the ICTY if
NATO were to continue to disobey the order, Todorović gained
leverage in his negotiations with the Prosecutor. NATO, the U.S.,
and other states appealed the decision and the Appeals Chamber
stayed the Trial Chamber’s order pending the outcome of the appeal.
Meanwhile, ICTY lawyers scrambled behind the scenes. While the
appeal was pending, the OTP and the defendant filed a joint and
confidential ex parte motion, submitting to the court a negotiated plea
agreement.242 Todorović agreed to plea guilty to the crime of
persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds as a crime

See Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 119.
Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 95, at 119.
241 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense
Motion on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tdec/en/100895.htm.
242 See Prosecutor v. Simic, Simic, Tadic, Todorovic, and Zaric, Case No.
IT-95-9-PT, Judicial Supplements, Decision on (1) Application by Stevan
Todorovic to re-open the Decision of 27 July 1999, (2) Motion by ICRC to ReOpen Scheduling Order of 18 November 1999, and (3) Conditions for Access to
Material (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2000),
http://icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/jud_supplement/supp12-e/simic.htm.
239
240
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against humanity.243 Tellingly, the plea agreement specifically required
him to withdraw: (1) all pending motions regarding his arrest; (2) all
factual allegations that his arrest was unlawful; and (3) all claims that
NATO or SFOR participated in any unlawful activity in connection
his arrest.244 To secure the deal, the OTP withdrew the remaining
twenty-six counts and recommended a prison sentence of five to
twelve years.245
The Sikirica case involved three defendants: Duško Sikirica,
Damir Došen and Dragan Kolundžija.246 All three were charged with
crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of
war. However, Sikirica was also charged with genocide. The
defendants all entered a plea of not guilty and the case proceeded to
trial.247 After the close of the Prosecution’s case-in-chief, Sikirica filed
a Rule 98bis motion to dismiss the genocide count, which was
granted. Then, to everyone’s surprise, during the presentation of the
defense rebuttal, one of Sikirica’s co-defendants changed his plea and
pled guilty to crimes against humanity. With the code of silence
broken, the remaining defendants also sought the Prosecutor for a
plea bargain. The plea agreement between Sikirica and the OTP made
clear that the Prosecutor would not have accepted his plea while the
charges of genocide were still pending against him.248 This reluctance
towards plea-bargaining is in line with the OTP’s policy in the Jelisić
Count 1 of the indictment. Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing
Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 5.
244 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Decision on the
Prosecution Motion to Withdraw Counts of the Indictment and Defence Motion
to Withdraw Pending Motions, para. 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 26, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/todorovic/tdec/en/10226DC515095.htm;
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 5.
245 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Decision on the Prosecution Motion to
Withdraw Counts of the Indictment and Defence Motion to Withdraw Pending
Motions, supra note 244, at para. 2; Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment,
supra note 58, at para. 4.
246 Sikirica was the most senior ranking of the three.
247 See William Schabas, Commentary, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, VOLUME VIII: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 2001-2002 1078-82 (André
Klip & Göran Sluite eds., 2005), for a commentary on this case.
248 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sententing Judgment, supra note 84, at para. 24.
243
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cases. The ICTY Prosecutor manifested complete aversion toward
any type of bargaining or deal making that would require her to
withdraw a genocide charge.
While the Prosecution refused to bargain in the Jelisić case, it
did not have to in the Erdemović case—he comprehensively and
immediately accepted responsibility to the entire indictment against
him. The Erdemović case challenges the ICTY’s current ideological
narrative constructed around reconciliation. Extant sentencing
judgments declare reconciliation as an ideology—something more
than mere ex post facto rationalization of an expanding plea bargaining
practice and lenient sentences, but as a principled justification for
mitigating penalty. However, the judges do not advance such a view
of reconciliation in the Erdemović sentencing judgment, even though
the facts of the case offered an opportunity to establish this platform.
Erdemović did not attempt to negotiate a deal behind the scenes. He
plead guilty to all crimes charged at his first hearing, expressed
genuine remorse, and fully cooperated with the Prosecution in bring
to light what happened. Although in subsequent cases, notably the
Plavšić case, these factors are considered relevant to determining the
accused’s contribution to reconciliation and thus a reduction in
punishment, the Erdemović Trial Chamber did not consider
contribution to reconciliation per se as a sentencing factor. In fact,
“reconciliation” is mentioned merely twice in passing in the entire
judgment.249 It is not discussed in relation to Erdemović’s acceptance
of guilt, nor do the international judges appear to be particularly
interested in the possibility that his unreserved admission of
responsibility for his share in the atrocities will foster reconciliation.
Compare this to the twenty-seven times the ICTY judges
discuss reconciliation in the Plavšić case and their unbridled
enthusiasm about how her narrowly crafted and limited admission
will have a significant impact on reconciliation in the former
Yugoslavia. It comes as no surprise that the notion of reconciliation
overwhelms the analysis of the sentencing judgment in the Plavšić
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at para.
58. In comparison, in the Plavšić case, the concept of reconciliation appears no less
than 27 times in the sentencing judgment. Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing
Judgment, supra note 36.
249
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case, but is non-existent in the Erdemović case. The latter did not
bargain his plea, made no demands for charge reduction, made no
effort to limit the factual basis of his admission (i.e. he did not limit
the historical record), and did not insist on first obtaining the
Prosecution’s agreement to recommend a reduced sentence.
Therefore, I argue that the rise of reconciliation as an ideology in
international criminal law has less to do with the goal of
reconciliation and more to do with rationalizing plea-bargaining.
Reconciliation gained notoriety in cases where the accused bargained
for a less comprehensive factual record and a reduction in charges or
punishment.250 But this deal making in the face of grossly
unspeakable crimes required a counterweight. Enter reconciliation. It
is an apology for plea-bargaining atrocity crimes, an attempt to recast
plea deals as an ally of truth and history rather than cutting the legs of
public and accurate record building. These matters are addressed in
greater detail in the next section.
To summarize the background materials, the ICTY’s early
jurisprudence and practice seems to indicate that reconciliation was
not a central issue in sentencing and that the Prosecution was
unwilling to bargain away the charge of genocide. The Plavšić case
reversed the trajectory on both matters. It was the first time the
Prosecutor willingly dropped the charges of genocide against an
accused in return for her guilty plea. Moreover, it marked the coming
of age of “reconciliation” as it proved an influential force in
mitigating Biljana Plavšić’s sentence.
2. The coming of age of reconciliation ideology
The Plavšić case marks a turning point in the ICTY’s legacy.
The rise of reconciliation ideology as a justification for the practice of
plea-bargaining251 and as a mitigating factor in sentencing can trace
their origins to this case. Prior to the Plavšić Sentencing Judgment, only
250 Janine Natalya Clark, Plea-Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and
Reconciliation, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 415, 416 (2009) (arguing that reconciliation is
“seriously undermined” by plea-bargaining and reduced prison sentences).
251 See Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 341 (concluding that
the only viable justification for plea bargaining is efficiency), for a critique of
various justifications for plea-bargaining.

93

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

three cases in the ICTY’s ten-year history had been disposed of by
plea-bargaining. In sharp contrast, following the Plavšić judgment, the
first twelve months alone witnessed at least seven cases disposed of
by way of plea-bargaining.252 These plea bargains occasioned
“unseemly” lenient sentencing recommendations by the OTP.253
Likewise, the practice of dismissing the charge of genocide can trace
its origins to the Plavšić case. Plavšić was initially indicted for the

Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-2-S, Sentencing Judgment,
paras. 9-16 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_simic/tjug/en/sim-sj021017e.pdf (pleading
guilty on May 13, 2002); Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S,
Sentencing Judgment, paras. 10, 12-21 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
May
21,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/obrenovic/tjug/en/obrsj031210e.pdf (pleading guilty on May 21, 2003); Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić,
Case No IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/nikolic/tjug/en/mnik-sj031202-e.pdf
(pleading
guilty on May 7, 2003); Prosecutor v. Mrda, Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mrda/tjug/en/sj-040331.pdf (pleading guilty on July
24, 2003); Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, paras.
7-14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/miodrag_jokic/tjug/en/jok-sj040318e.pdf (pleading
guilty on Aug. 27, 2003); Prosecutor v. Banović, Case No. IT-02-65-1-S, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 13 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 28, 2003)
(pleading
guilty
on
June
26,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/banovic/tjug/en/ban-sj031028e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Dragan Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 5, 14 (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
18,
2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tjug/en/nik-sj031218e.pdf (pleading
guilty on Sept. 4, 2003); Prosecutor v. Češić, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/cesic/tjug/en/ces-tj040311e.pdf (pleading guilty on
Oct. 8, 2003); Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at paras.
18-19 (pleading guilty on Sept. 30, 2003); Prosecutor v. Babić, Case No. IT-03-72S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June
29,
2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/babic/tjug/en/bab-sj040629e.pdf
(pleading guilty on Jan. 27, 2004); Miroslav Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-S, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/bralo/tjug/en/bra-sj051207-e.pdf (pleading guilty on
July 19, 2005).
253 See Nancy Amoury Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes:
The Limited Influence of Sentencing Discounts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 69, 93 (2006).
252
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crime of genocide and complicity in genocide.254 Departing from its
practice in the past, the Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte
subsequently made a deal with Plavšić to withdraw the counts and
allegations specifically pertaining to genocide and complicity in
genocide and also all remaining crimes, with the exception of
persecution as a crime against humanity. In return, Plavšić would
plead guilty to one count for the crime of persecution.255
She was the first defendant for whom the Prosecution
willingly withdrew the genocide charges from the indictment in
exchange for a plea. Ironically, this first time willingness came in a
case were the defendant was most likely among the more culpable for
the allegedly genocidal policies from among those charged with the
crime.256 Given the magnitude of the case, the high ranking and
profile of the accused, the gravity of her crimes (as originally alleged),
and the fact that the Chief Prosecutor herself appeared at an
accused’s sentencing hearing, which she rarely did, the people of
Yugoslavia and the international community rightfully expected an
accounting for Del Ponte’s decision to drop genocide from the
indictment. However, she offered no explanation in the public forum
of an international courtroom. Nor did the judges press her for one.
If there was a good reason for the compromise, it did not appear in
the Court’s official records or sentencing judgment.

254 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-40-I, Indictment, para. 19 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Apr.
3,
2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/ind/en/pla-ii000407e.pdf. The counts were:
Count 1(Genocide) and Count 2 (Complicity in Genocide).
255 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40-PT, Plea Agreement
(Int’l Crim Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 30, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/custom4/en/020930plea_en.pdf. This was
filed ex parte confidential and under seal. This document is available and on file with
the author.
256 In her published memoirs, Del Ponte describes Plavšić as a “close
associate” of the notorious Radovan Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik. Del Ponte
further claims that Plavšić “participated at the highest political levels in the
campaign to dismember Bosnia and Herzegovina and ethnically cleanse large
swaths of its territory.” See CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR:
CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY’S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF
IMPUNITY 160 (2008).
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If the judges genuinely believe that the goal of reconciliation
is central to the Tribunal’s mandate, that International Tribunals have
the capacity to contribute to reconciliation, and that substantial
sentencing reductions actually promote reconciliation, then they must
account for why genocide was removed from the scope of Plavšić
liability and why a prison sentence of eleven years supports rather
than undermines the goal of reconciliation. The absence of
transparency regarding the circumstances resulting in a factual record
narrower than the original indictment undermines reconciliation and
truth finding. Rather than address difficult questions about
responsibility and punishment that are crucial to the goal of
reconciliation, international sentencing judgments idealize
reconciliation as vague aspirations of ICL while remaining
impervious to factors that undermine it. The judgments mistake
acceptance of responsibility and apology (often short lived) for
reconciliation. Del Ponte has even admitted that Plavšić’s admissions
and apologies offered nothing towards reconciliation.257 The Plavšić
Trial Chamber’s discussion and analysis of reconciliation raises three
concerns in relation to sentencing.
a. Is reconciliation itself mitigating? – Certain post-crime actions by
the accused, such as expression of remorse, truth-telling, cooperation
with the Prosecutor, and genuine and sincere acceptance of
responsibility have been accepted as appropriate reasons to mitigate
the punishment of a convicted person precisely because these factors,
inter alia, potentially contribute to the aim of reconciliation. However,
the Plavšić Trial Chamber appears to go beyond this and treat
reconciliation itself as an independent mitigating factor.
The problem with treating reconciliation as an independent
ground for sentence mitigation lies in the limitations of criminal
justice legalism. Reconciliation is better understood as a slow
rebuilding process, not an event. While judicial institutions are quite
capable of determining whether a war criminal “voluntarily
surrendered,” they are not particularly apt at predicting future events.
Whether the accused has “contributed to reconciliation” is usually
difficult to measure with legal certainty. It cannot be put sufficiently
257

See CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 256, at

161.
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beyond the realms of speculation so as to satisfy the Tribunal’s legal
standards or the requirements of law.258 Some factors relevant to
assessing a defendant’s contribution to reconciliation are admittedly
less speculative such as an accused who goes door to door
apologizing to specific families that he has victimized, or volunteers
for demining operations, or helps victims identify locations whether
murdered family members have been hidden or buried. But the
contribution to reconciliation of factors, such as a general apology,
on which the Plavšić Trial Chamber relied, is highly speculative.
Moreover, they can be undone in a way that concert action (such as
the above list) beyond mere words cannot be. Thus, as is the case
with other consequentialist aims, the court treads in dangerous
territory when judges allow reconciliation to influence its sentencing
allocations.
For example, Plavšić gave an interview to Banja Luka ATV
on March 11th, 2005, that undermines her purported contribution to
reconciliation based on her apology and public statement that the
judge used to justify mitigating her penalty to eleven years
imprisonment.259 Barely two years after her public remorse and
apology in the courtroom of the ICTY, she denied all responsibility
for her role in the atrocities to the viewing public back in the former
Yugoslavia. With thousands, if not tens of thousand, of persons
whose lives she victimized, she emphatically claimed: (1) she only
pled guilty because witnesses that would establish her innocence were
afraid to come forward; (2) smug international judges sitting in The
Hague far away from the realities of the conflict could not
comprehend that a high ranking person in her position, removed
from the battlefield, may not know what is going on at the ground
level; (3) Western powers accept that the real culprits of the conflict

258 While aggravating circumstance must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, mitigating circumstance need only be proved on a balance of probabilities.
See Prosecutor v. Milan Simić, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, paras.
39-40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_simic/tjug/en/sim-sj021017e.pdf.
259 Interview by Banja Luka ATV with Biljana Plavšić (Mar. 11, 2005),
http://www.atvbl.com/home.php?id=billjanaintervju. An unofficial translation
into English by the ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo is available on file with the
author.
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where the Bosnians that wanted independence in the first place.260 To
the victims, her statements most likely came across as: (1) I am not
responsible; (2) the Bosnian Serb leadership is not responsible; and
(3) the victims got what they deserved. Perhaps Del Ponte and the
international judges had no reason to suspect that Plavšić would so
fantastically and publically unravel the foundations of her mitigated
penalty. Nevertheless, the experience illustrated why the ICC should
not entangle with consequentialist aspirations. At least, judges should
not allow the goal of reconciliation to influence sentencing
allocations.
b. Failure to link lack of cooperation to sentencing discounts based on
purported contribution to reconciliation. – The sentencing law of
international criminal courts and tribunals recognize cooperation with
the Prosecutor or Court as a mitigation factor.261 Under the ICTY
rules in particular, it is the only mitigation factor explicitly provided.
Plavšić firmly refused to cooperate with the ICTY OTP, despite
several interventions by Del Ponte and her team to get Plavšić to
reverse course.262 When Del Ponte tried to include in the plea
agreement a condition that Plavšić agree to be a witness in the cases
of persons who bore the greatest responsibility for the atrocities such
as Radovan Karadzić, Momčilo Krajišnik, and Ratko Mladić, Plavšić
flatly refused and the Chief Prosecutor backed down.263 Del Ponte
would later write in her memoirs that Plavšić had deceived her into
thinking that she would cooperate.264
If part of the justification for the Prosecution to engage in
plea-bargaining lies in the theory of “breaking the circle of silence”
among the leadership, then her guilty plea wholly deprived
international justice of any such benefit. In fact, she appears to go out
of her way to insulate them and protect them from the atrocities she
See id.
INT’L CRIM CT. R. P. & EVID. 145 (2)(a)(iii) (2003); INT’L CRIM. TRIB.
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA R. P. & EVID. 101 (2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_
Rev43_en.pdf.
262 See CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 256, at
161-62.
263 See id. at 161.
264 See id.
260
261
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acknowledges took place. She expressly stated that the responsibility
for the crimes to which she bore witness are hers and hers “alone”
and do not “extend to other leaders who have the right to defend
themselves”.265 Her failure to cooperate should have been factored in
to the weight given to her “contribution to reconciliation.” I am not
suggesting that the court do what the Blaskic Trial Chamber did when
it treated non-cooperation as an aggravating factor.266 The
international sentencing jurisprudence correctly rejects such an
approach.267 Nevertheless, failure to cooperation with international
justice is relevant to assessing the accused’s “contribution to
reconciliation.” Plavšić’s conduct and statements carefully avoid
implicating her co-perpetrators Karadžić and Krajišnik in the
atrocities and cast doubt on her commitment to reconciliation.
Loyalty to her fellow nationalist over accounting for crimes
perpetrated against other ethnic groups does little to defuse ethnic
tensions. The judges noted expert testimony that “full disclosure in
confessions is vital for the reconciliatory process.”268 Again, we see
another example of the international judges failing to meaningfully
analyze the accused’s conduct and factors relevant to punishment in
relation to what they earlier identified as the purpose of sentencing,
in this case, reconciliation. Plavšić’s failure to disclose the role of
other high-ranking Serbs in atrocity crimes to the full extent of her
knowledge undermines the goal of reconciliation. The judges should
have weighed the potential adverse impact this has on their
purported goal, especially because they used reconciliation ideology
to justify a lower sentence.269

Dragan Stanimirovic, Plavsic’s Guilt Trip, TRANSITIONS ONLINE (Dec.
23, 2002); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Factual Statement in
Support of Plea (2000).
266 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 774. See
Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, supra note 81, at 327.
267 See Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, supra note 81, at 328.
268 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 77
(emphasis by Trial Chamber).
269 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at paras.
66-81. In the Trial Chamber’s own assessment, “these circumstances make a
formidable body of mitigation”. Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra
note 36, at para. 110.
265
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Local reactions support my argument. Sefko Alomerović,
President of the Helsinki Board in Sandzak at the time of Plavšić’s
sentencing, also drew attention to her failure to “bring into question
the state policy that led towards the extinction of the Bosnian people,
in which she played an important role.”270 Although the Trial
Chamber expressly disagreed with the Prosecutor’s evaluation of the
weight to be accorded to this factor in mitigation,271 in light of the
foregoing, the Prosecutor’s assessment seems to better capture the
extent of her contribution to reconciliation. The OTP recommended
a prison term of fifteen to twenty-fix years.272 The Trial Chamber
sentenced her to eleven years.273 This was not the first time a trial
chamber imposed a sentence lower than the Prosecutor’s
recommendation, but it was the first time the Prosecutor did not
appeal a low sentence outside its recommended range.
c. Superior position results in paradoxical boost for mitigation. –
Generally, sentencing discounts for guilty pleas are justified on the
grounds of their functional utility, namely that plea bargains can
result in efficiency benefits by saving costs and Tribunal resources
related to investigation, counsel fees, trial costs, etc. The Plavšić Trial
Chamber, however, attempts to offer more than a functional
justification for plea bargains that result in large sentencing
reductions by arguing that they substantially contribute to the
Tribunal’s presumed mandate. In the Plavšić case, the judges
characterized Plavšić’s negotiated and carefully contrived guilty plea
as a genuine expression of remorse that contributed to reconciliation,
rather than a self-interested maneuvered that resulting in limiting her
criminal liability and punishment.274
Apparently, the Trial Chamber was guided in this direction by
the Prosecutor who amplified the mitigating value of Plavšić’s
contribution to “reconciliation” and “expressions of remorse” based
270 See Milanka Saponja-Hadzic, Hague Deals Reduce Impact, INST. OF WAR
& PEACE REPORTING (July 24, 2003), http://iwpr.net/report-news/hague-dealsreduce-impact.
271 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para.
130.
272 Id. at para. 128.
273 Id. at para. 132.
274 Id. at para. 70.

100

2014

Dana

3:1

on her superior position as a high-ranking and high-profiled member
of the Bosnian Serb war leadership.275
The Trial Chamber noted: “[t]he Prosecution states that this
expression of remorse is noteworthy since it is offered from a person who
formerly held a leadership position, and that it ‘merits judicial
consideration.’”276 Thus, the Plavšić Trial Chamber endorsed the
notion that expressions of remorse have added value for the
purposes of reconciliation when offered by high-ranking defendants,
and thus are deserving of greater reduction in sentence.277 This
position, however, is at odds with basic principles of justice and the
ICTY’s own jurisprudence, which has long held that the superior
position of the accused is a factor that aggravates, rather than
mitigates, the accused’s punishment.
Unfortunately, the Plavšić precedent favoring high-ranking
perpetrators when it comes to mitigation of penalty based on
contribution to reconciliation is having a pernicious influence on the
subsequent cases. In some cases, it appears that both the Prosecutor
and the judges award less sentencing reduction for low-level
defendants who contribute to reconciliation.278 Citing the Plavšić
ruling, some defense counsels even appear convinced that their
client’s potential contribution to reconciliation is only worth arguing
if the client is a person of high rank.279
3. The perverse effects of reconciliation
As noted above, reconciliation was not a significant factor in
sentencing in the early practice of the ICTY. However, since the
Plavšić Sentencing Judgment, it has received frequent consideration by
trial chambers when addressing sentencing. In the Plavšić case, it
Id. at para. 70.
Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 70
(emphasis added).
277 Id. at para. 70.
278 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94. This
case is discussed in detail below.
279 Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 110 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/obrenovic/tjug/en/obr-sj031210e.pdf.
275
276
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exerted a significant influence in mitigating her punishment. Many
commentators consider Plavšić’s eleven-year sentence to be very
lenient in both absolute terms and in symbolic terms.280 As it has
done with other factors such as deterrence and rehabilitation, the
Appeals Chamber should likewise encourage a cautious approach
towards awarding significant reduction of the penalty on the basis of
“contribution towards reconciliation.” Caution here is justified on
both moral and practical basis. The Plavšić case illustrates why.
During Plavšić’s sentencing hearing, I observed, first hand,
defense counsel argue to the judges that her remorse and acceptance
of responsibility was a more significant contribution to reconciliation
than had the same come from a lower ranking perpetrator. Defense
counsel boldly declared: “what greater contribution do you have to
your mandate than my client’s—a person at the very top of the
Bosnian Serb leadership—admission of responsibility.”281 Never
mind that her limited acceptance of responsibility was known to the
judges or that her remorse proved to be ostensible. Nonetheless, all
this coming from the Defense was largely expected. The real surprise
was that Chief Prosecutor Carla de Ponte, in a rare court appearance
at a sentencing hearing, made the same argument but even more
emphatically.282 She argued that as a high-ranking figure and former
leader, her remorse and contribution to reconciliation is particular
noteworthy and merits special consideration.283 Thus, in advancing a
framework for how reconciliation should influence sentencing
allocations, the Chief Prosecutor advocates for greater sentencing
reductions for those in high-ranking positions, thereby turning upside

See Nancy A. Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes, supra
note 253, at 98; Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for
Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 688-9, n.21 (2007). See also Daria
Sito-Sucic, Muslim Victims Outraged, Say Plavšić Sentence Low, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2003;
Amra Kebo, Regional Report: Plavsic Sentence Divides Bosnia, INST. OF WAR & PEACE
REPORTING (Feb. 22, 2005), http://iwpr.net/report-news/regional-report-plavsicsentence-divides-bosnia.
281 See Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1, Sentencing
Hearing Transcript, para. 649 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17,
2002).
282 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 70.
283 Id.
280
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down the relationship between superior position and punishment.284
The judges agreed, finding that Plavšić’s position at the very top of
the Bosnian Serb Presidency gave “significant weight” to her
contribution to reconciliation. Because the Trial Chamber accepted
the goal of reconciliation as a relevant factor for fixing a sentence, it
was able to justify substantial reduction of prison time.
Accordingly, greater contributions to reconciliation merit
greater reduction in punishment. Unfortunately, ICTY judges and the
Chief Prosecutor appear to weigh the value of an accused’s
contribution to reconciliation based largely on his or her rank. Under
their approach, high-ranking offenders, who accept responsibility for
their wrongdoings, deserve more sentencing reduction than low-level
individuals merely because of their status. The perverse effect of this
consequentialist approach towards punishment is that the leaders
who are most culpable for the atrocities receive greater sentencing
discounts, as demonstrated by how the ICTY subsequently dealt with
the punishment of low-level perpetrators.285 Adding to a sense of
injustice is the fact that their purported “contribution to
reconciliation” is in relation to sufferings and atrocities that the
leaders themselves created.
Therefore, the logical conclusion of the reconciliation
ideology adopted by the Plavšić Trial Chamber is that less culpable
and lower ranking perpetrators will not receive the same degree of
mitigation, resulting in higher penalties. If so, this would be elitism at
its worst and consequentialism at its most perverse. In order to test
this hypothesis, I examined the ICTY sentencing judgments to
identify cases similar to Plavšić. Two cases—the prosecutions of
Miroslav Bralo and Dragon Nikolić—shared several factors in
common with the Plavšić case. Both involved plea-bargained guilty
pleas, convictions for crimes against humanity, underlying crimes that
included killings and murder, and in both cases, the trial judges found
reconciliation to be a mitigation factor in sentencing.
Superior position is an aggravating factor in the ICTY jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at
para. 95; Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, § X
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tjug/en/nik-sj031218e.pdf.
284
285
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In the Bralo case, a Croatian defendant—a relatively minor
figure in the conflict—was initially only charged with war crimes.286
Because of his complete self-effacing cooperation with the
Prosecutor, Miroslav Bralo exposed himself to further criminal
liability for persecution as a crime against humanity. The Prosecution
mercilessly moved to amend the indictment to expanded Bralo’s
individual criminal responsibility to include the crime of
persecution.287 Bralo did not oppose the motion. In fact, he did not
challenge or dispute any charge or allegation in the extended
indictment and pled guilty to all charges.288 The trial judges
considered his unexpurgated acceptance of criminal responsibility as
an unequivocal sign of sincere remorse and willingness to be held
accountable.289
As noted above, the process leading to an accused’s
admission to his or her participation in atrocity crimes and ethnic
violence impacts the goal of reconciliation. Plavšić and Bralo stand in
sharp contrast. The former machinated to limit and diffuse the scope
and gravity of her crimes, successfully minimizing her criminal
responsibility. Her plea deal included charge reduction with the
removal of genocide from the record, thereby alternating the
narrative of the conflict and degree of victimization. Bralo, on the
other hand, showed unabridged acknowledgement of his moral
blameworthiness and took full responsibility for his wrongful
conduct. While Plavšić bargained down her responsibility, Bralo
accepted responsibility beyond the initial charges against him.
Working from the ICTY premise that reconciliation is an
appropriate goal of sentencing for international crimes, Bralo’s
contribution to reconciliation arguably merits greater mitigation.290
The Trial Chamber found that Bralo apologized to victims in person
and through personalized letters, identified previously unknown

286 Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Indictment
against Miroslav Bralo Made Public, JL/P.I.S./902-e, (Oct. 13, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/sid/8352.
287 Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para. 62.
288 Id. at paras. 5-6.
289 Id. at para. 60.
290 Id. at para. 72.
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locations of mass graves allowing survivors to carry out funerals for
their departed in accordance with their religion and customs, in some
cases exhuming the body from the mass grave himself, and
participated in de-mining operations.291 This may be understood as
direct reconciliatory acts. It is more tangible to individual victims than
Plavšić’s prescribed general apology. Although the Tribunal held that
Bralo contributed to reconciliation,292 it did not afford Bralo’s acts as
much weight in mitigation as was awarded to Plavšić. Has the ICTY’s
reconciliation ideology turned the significance of superior position or
authority as an aggravating factor upside down? Plavšić’s punishment
was imprisonment for eleven years. Bralo received a prison sentence
of twenty years,293 nearly twice as much as Plavšić, despite the fact
that she was in the very highest echelons of the Bosnian Serb
leadership prosecuting the war, second only to Radovan Karadzić.294
At the time of her sentencing, she was the highest-ranking figure on
any side of the conflict to be punished by the ICTY.295 Bralo was a
relatively low ranking figure, a Croatian foot soldier in a notorious
military unit with little or no command authority.296 Dragon Nikolić,

Id. at paras. 66-71.
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, para. 71.
293 Id. at para. 95.
294 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 10.
See also Nancy A. Combs, nternational Decisions: Prosecutor v Plavsić, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
929, 930 (2003) (“From 1990 through 1992, Plavsić was the Serbian representative
to the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, serving for
a time as the acting co-president of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and later as a member of the collective and expanded Presidencies of
the Republika Srpska. Known as the ‘Serbian Iron Lady’ as a result of her hard-line
nationalism and rabidly anti-Muslim views, Plavsić was a close ally of Radovan
Karadzić.”); CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 256, at 16061.
295 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 10;
Combs, International Decisions, supra note 295, at 930; CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME
PROSECUTOR, supra note 256, at 160. When Plavsić was sentenced, the other senior
figures who bore the greatest responsibility for the atrocities were either not in
custody or their trials were ongoing.
296 Prosecutor v. Bralo, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 94, at
para. 2.
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also a relatively low level perpetrator, was sentenced to 23 twentythree years of imprisonment.297
Plavšić’s low sentence compared to higher penalties for Bralo
and Nikolić is inconsistent with the Tribunal’s sentencing practice
and legal rulings that superior position or authority is an aggravating
factor. By this measure, Plavšić should have received a more severe
punishment, all other material factors being equal—and they
generally are. Similarly, the difference in the distribution of
punishment does not square with Tribunal sentencing law in that
cooperation with the Prosecution is a significant mitigating factor, if
not the most significant. The trial judges found that Bralo and
Nikolić substantially cooperated with the Prosecutor, a mitigating
factor that was absent in Plavšić’s case. Compounding the disparity,
one could reasonably conclude that cooperation with the Court or
the Prosecutor itself constitutes “contribution towards
reconciliation.” Likewise, it would have been reasonable for the trial
chambers to treat intentional non-cooperation as diminishing the
value of an accused’s asserted contribution to reconciliation. In sum,
analyzing the court’s treatment of the two sentencing factors—one
aggravating factor (superior position/authority) and one mitigating
circumstance (cooperation with the Prosecution)—reveals perverse
results where judges attempt to reflect the goal of reconciliation in
sentencing allocations. Plavšić, who used her superior position to
perpetrate grave crimes and offered no cooperation with the OTP,
received a very lenient penalty, while other defendants, who were
low-level perpetrators and cooperated with the Prosecution, received
significantly harsher sentences. Reconciliation ideology was so
influential that it resulted in misapplication of two well entrench
sentencing principles in international criminal law.
Judging by the fact that low-level offenders were punished
twice has harshly as high-ranking perpetrators, the ICTY
disproportionately awards more penalty reduction for reconciliation
to the latter. Interestingly, the Bralo Trial Chamber stated that if there
were no mitigating factors, it would have imposed a prison sentence

Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Appeals Sentencing Judgment, supra
note 60, at paras. 2, 4.
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of twenty-five years.298 Thus, Bralo received a sentencing reduction of
5 five years that accounts for all the mitigation factors found in his
case. His contribution to reconciliation amounts to something much
less than a 5 five-year discount, significantly lower than the discount
given to Plavšić’s.
Unfortunately, the perverse effects of consequentialism
permeate the entire ICTY institution beyond the international judges.
Consequentialism in the decision-making of the ICTY Prosecutor
influenced its presentation of the case during oral arguments, its
application of sentencing factors, and finally its sentencing
recommendation. It argued that Plavšić’s contribution to
reconciliation based on her “expression of remorse is noteworthy
since it is offered from a person who formerly held a leadership
position, and that it ‘merits judicial consideration.’”299 Thus, the
Prosecutor links the mitigating value of an accused’s contribution to
reconciliation to her superior position. Similarly, in cases where
reconciliation is a factor, the OTP exercises its discretion to
recommend sentences that offer greater penalty reduction to highranking perpetrators. The court typically follows the OTP’s
recommendations in plea bargains.
For example, the Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte
recommended a prison sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years for
Plavšić. She represented to the Court that if Plavšić had not pled
guilty she would have recommended life imprisonment.300 Typically,
the ICTY grants early release after the defendant has served twothirds of the sentence.301 Accordingly, when the OTP recommends a
prison term of twenty-five years, it is effectively asking for a sentence
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para. 95.
Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36, at para. 70
(emphasis added).
300 Id. para. 59. See also CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra
note 256, at 161.
301 Ines Monica Weinberg de Roca & Christopher M. Rassi, Sentencing and
Incarceration in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 50-51 (2008) (“At the
ICTY, early release is determined by the implied powers of the President, which is
particularly instructive when examining the case of the eight ICTY-convicted
persons granted early release, after serving approximately two-thirds of their
sentence.”).
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of a little more than sixteen-and-a-half years. Thus, its low-end
recommendation of fifteen years in the Plavšić case is effectively a
recommendation for ten years. The Trial Chamber gave Plavšić
eleven years, which meant she was out in seven years and a few
months.
The OTP’s discretion was exercised more harshly when
recommending a sentencing for Bralo. Although it initially asked for
a prison sentence of twenty-five years, at the sentencing hearing the
OTP stated that it was in fact seeking a “mandatory minimum” of
twenty-five years.302 Thus, accounting for the two-thirds approach
outline above, the OTP recommendation was effectively a prison
sentence of thirty-seven-and-a-half years. The OTP’s policy towards
reconciliation and mitigating factors indicate that it assigned less
value to Bralo’s contribution to reconciliation because he is a low
profile perpetrator, in other words, because of his status.303 Its policy
manifested an aggressive recommendation for a harsher penalty for
the low level perpetrator because he is a low level person, despite his
cooperation with the Prosecution. The ICTY’s reconciliation
ideology is driving this recommendation.
A final point of interest here concerns Plavšić’s release from
prison. She reserved her prison time at a women’s prison called
“Hinseberg” located in Frövi, Örebro County, Sweden. The inmates
call it “the castle” because it is a mansion overlooking a lake.304 The
prisoners can engage in artistic activities, enjoy saunas, bake for
leisure, and even ride horses.305 In 2009, after serving two-thirds of
her sentence, she applied to the ICTY for early release.306 Although
her application for early release was made after her repudiation of
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para. 90.
Id. at para. 62.
304 Luxury prison for Bosnia’s Iron Lady, TELEGRAPH, June 7, 2013,
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1030607/asp/foreign/story_2044806.asp.
305 Id.
306 See generally President of the Int’l Trib. Judge Patrick Robinson, IT-0039 & 40/1-ES, Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or
Commutation of Sentence of Mrs. Biljana Plavšić (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/presdec/en/090914.pdf [hereinafter Plavšić
Pardon Decision].
302
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responsibility on public television, something she repeated again for a
local newspaper,307 ICTY President Judge Patrick Robinson granted
her motion for release finding that she was “rehabilitated.”308 No
mention was made of her renunciation of responsibility, her slide
backwards towards justifying her criminal behavior, or her complete
nullification of her apology, which was central to mitigating her
sentence.309
CONCLUSION
With the creation of the ICC, international criminal justice
gained a permanent mechanism with potentially global reach. The
potential latent in such an international court has fueled high
expectations.310 Yet, the growing list of objectives and goals has
resulted in unrealistic expectations of international prosecutions of
atrocity crimes. Consequently, fulfilment of the core functions of
international criminal justice has been jeopardized. The pressure to
chase aggrandized ambitions comes not only from politicians, or
special interest groups, or media frenzies. Actors within the system,
particularly international judges, have to some extent bought into
romanticized notions that their legal institutions can achieve an
awesome array of societal goals, even when some of those objectives
are in direct conflict with each other. This overreach has had a
negative impact on the sentencing of perpetrators of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. Judges at international criminal
courts have elaborated a smorgasbord of ideological objectives for
international criminal prosecutions, resulting in perverse and
confusing justifications for individual sentences.

Carrie Schimizzi, Bosnia war crimes victims submit evidence against former
Serbian
officials,
JURIST
(Apr.
8,
2011),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/04/bosnia-war-crimes-victims-submitevidence-against-former-serbian-officials.php; Iva Martinović, Outcry at Plavsic’s
Belgrade Welcome, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Nov. 4, 2009),
http://iwpr.net/report-news/outcry-plavsics-belgrade-welcome.
308 See Plavšić Pardon Decision, supra note 306, at para. 8.
309 See id.
310 Although, significantly, it is lacking its own law enforcement regime to
carry out basic police tasks, or a standing “police force” so to speak.
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The ad hoc tribunals have drawn on a wide range of sources
when identifying the sentencing rationales for international criminal
justice. Although deterrence and retribution appear most frequently
in the tribunal’s sentencing judgments, international judges appealed
to a much wider range of justifications, legal and political, to
legitimize their sentences, in particular sentences that would
otherwise appear to be extremely lenient. This toggling at will
between punitive and restorative approaches to punishment has
opened the work of international criminal tribunals to criticism of
bias, politicization, and victor’s justice. International idealism defeats
itself. There are many learning lessons here for the ICC and pitfalls to
avoid.
This article’s findings caution against international criminal
justice mechanism becoming too entangled with idealistic aspirations,
such as reconciliation or producing a historical record, at the cost of
their primary function to punish perpetrators of atrocity crimes. By
analyzing the tribunals’ jurisprudence, this article demonstrates how
international judges often veer off course away from their primary
role in light of the realistic capacity of international criminal courts
when attempting to achieve other well-meaning goals that are beyond
the institutional capacity of international criminal courts. This results
in problematic rulings, distortion of responsibility or accountability,
and ultimately failure to achieve the desired aspirations because of
institutional and structural limitations.
Arguably, international judges cannot commit to serious
punitive measures and simultaneously prioritize pragmatic
considerations, as weak institutions must—such as, incentivizing
voluntary surrender or encouraging cooperation. Perhaps they are
unwilling to impose meaningful penalties out of misplaced idealism
that their leniency will bring other high-ranking perpetrators, those
who bear the greatest responsibility, to the table. This strategy failed.
None of the remaining most wanted perpetrators followed Plavšić’s
suit in either surrendering to the court or admitting responsibility.
Krajišnik maintained his innocence and opted for a trial.311Karadzić
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, para.
888 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/tjug/en/kra-jud060927e.pdf.
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and Mladić refused to surrender.312 Vojislav Šešelj defiantly denounce
the ICTY as an “illegal tribunal” and his court appointed counsel as a
“spy” for Western imperialism.313
An analysis of the sentencing jurisprudence suggests that
international judges pick and choose, without principled justification,
an ideology to follow in a particular case that serves the desired result
they have in mind for that case. In subsequent cases, that ideology
may be abandoned or marginalized, without explanation, if it proves
to be an obstacle to their desired sentence. This is particularly true in
the case of the ICTY where the sentencing jurisprudence lacks
commitment to prioritizing a principle to guide sentencing
allocations. In order words, ICL sentencing lacks commitment to a
general principle that will influence its determination of a sentence.
Another observation that may be made, aside from failure to
identify a primary sentencing philosophy, is that quite often the
proffered rationales are inconsistent with the actual sentencing
results. Under-theorization and the absence of scholarly examination
of the sentencing jurisprudence of international criminal courts has
left us with an ad hoc approach to sentencing for genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. In the absence of a guiding theory,
the wide discretion given to international judges in sentencing has
failed to produce a rational and consistent international sentencing
practice. To the contrary, certain ideologies resulted in injustice in
sentencing. This is particularly so when reconciliation ideology
influenced the sentence, and therefore it should be abandoned or
given very limited weight. A possible unfortunate legacy of the
ICTY’s sentencing jurisprudence is that high-ranking perpetrators in
leadership positions receive more reduction in prison sentence than
foot soldiers where both are found to have “contributed toward

312 Ed Vulliamy, Twelve years on, a killer on the loose, THE GUARDIAN, Dec.
1, 2007,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/dec/02/warcrimes.edvulliamy1.
313 Serb
nationalist rejects UN court, BBC, Nov. 8, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7084506.stm; Serb ultranationalist disrupts ware
crimes trial, REUTERS, Nov. 1, 2006, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2006/11/01/ukwarcrimes-seselj-idUKL0146563020061101.
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reconciliation.”314 Those most responsible for atrocities, in particular,
have benefited the most when reconciliation was advanced as a
rationale for mitigating punishment. They have received significantly
reduced sentences, often lower than their subordinates, thus
trivializing their culpability for the atrocities. Moreover, in general,
most utilitarian aspirations associated with international criminal
prosecutions should be abandoned as sentencing rationales because
they distort the individual perpetrator’s culpability.
This paper’s analysis demonstrates that when international
judges give undue weight to utilitarian aspirations in their sentencing
judgments, they distort and diminish the culpability and just
distribution of punishment among the various actors’ responsibility
for atrocity crimes in a situation. Moreover, the goals they seek to
achieve with their sentencing reductions, like reconciliation, are
beyond the immediate capacity of criminal courts. International
prosecutions should assume a more modest posture regarding its
capabilities, lest it damages its core responsibility of punishing
perpetrators of atrocities crimes. This is not to say that international
criminal justice cannot contribute to these aspirations, but rather that
it should not be given weight as a factor in sentencing.

See generally Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36;
Prosecutor v. Bralo, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 94.
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